UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
OFFICE OF MARINE SAFETY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20594

IN THE MATTER OF THE:	:	
	:	
MAJOR MARINE ACCIDENT	:	Docket Number
	:	DCA 01 MM 022

Thursday and Friday,
September 27 and 28, 2001

Interview of LT. MICHAEL J. COEN, USN

NTSB Representatives

TOM ROTH-ROFFY
Investigator in Charge

DENNIS CRIDER
Office of Systems Engineering

BARRY STRAUCH
Investigator

Also Present:

CAPTAIN TOM KYLE
U.S. Navy

P R O C E E D I N G S

8:55 a.m.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. So, I guess for the record, why don't we identify everybody in the room, so that it will be part of the record of our interview? Okay. Whenever you're ready. We're on the record now?

Okay. Good morning. The time is now about 8:55, and the date is 27th of September 2001, and we're here for the interview of Lt. Coen of the USS Greeneville.

Good morning, sir.

LT. COEN: Good morning.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: My name is Tom Roth-Roffy, and I'm an accident investigator with the National Transportation Safety Board in Washington, D.C., and I'm here to continue the investigation of the accident that occurred on the USS Greeneville with the fishing vessel Ehime Maru on February 9th, 2001.

Joining me at the interview are the gentlemen seated here, and I'll ask them to identify themselves now.

MR. CRIDER: I'm Dennis Crider with the Office of Research and Engineering with the NTSB.

MR. STRAUCH: I'm Barry Strauch. I'm here as

an investigator for the NTSB.

CAPTAIN KYLE: Captain Tom Kyle, the United States Navy representative.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Thank you.

For your information, the Safety Board is an independent Federal Government agency responsible for investigating transportation accidents that occur in the United States, and more specifically, the Office of Marine Safety, of which I am an employee, is responsible for investigating marine accidents that occur on the waterways of the United States.

The purpose of the Safety Board's investigation is to determine the cause of the accident and to make recommendations aimed at preventing future occurrences of similar accidents.

Our investigation makes no effort to assign blame for the accident nor do we have any legal authority to penalize any person involved in the accident. Our investigation is strictly a safety investigation and not a legal investigation.

If you desire, you may have another person assist you with the interview, if you like. Do you think you can make it through on your own?

LT. COEN: Yes, I do.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay.

LT. COEN: I may ask for a break once in awhile.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: That's fine. Whenever you feel you need a break, we'll do that, and if anybody else needs a break, we'll just take a break. We're going to try to be as informal as possible.

Would you please for the record, Lt. Coen, state your name and your full business address?

LT. COEN: My name is Lieutenant Michael John Coen. I'm attached to the USS Greeneville. I'm not sure of the exact -- exact address.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. We can probably get that if we need it.

All right. Well, we have a number of questions this morning. Probably what we'd like to do first is for you to think back to that February 9th, I believe it was a Friday morning, and try to recall everything that you can about that, about what you did and what happened on that day. If you could, just kind of in a narrative form, just go through from the time you came on board the sub, and I know that was a long time ago, and we appreciate you making the effort to, you know, take some time to think about the activities

and, you know, what happened, any significant events that may have happened.

I'd like for you to go ahead and go through that narrative from start to finish without interruption, if we could, and then after you're done, then we'll try to maybe focus in on some more specific questions of what happened.

So, if you're ready, go ahead and start.

LT. COEN: Okay. The morning of February 9th, we were going to sea for a VIP cruise. That morning, my responsibilities involved rigging the ship for dives. I was not a part of the watch. So, I'm usually taking the ship to sea.

I spent the morning getting the ship ready for dives, and I was one of the last to complete that evolution, and so that somewhat delayed the actual sail dive time in order to complete the checklist of rigging the ship for dives, the part that I was responsible for.

That did not go unnoticed by the senior members of the crew. The officer of the deck and the captain were tracking the status of that, wanting to know what was the -- what was the delay at that time. I was going through that to make sure that everything was

done in order and properly, and it's not something that you want to rush because there are consequences for not having the ship rigged for diving.

So, my duties were involved in that in the morning, and I got some very high tension from the captain asking for me to report the status of that. So, that was -- well, it was in the morning.

Once I completed that, the ship dove. I did duties for awhile up until the lunch time period, had lunch, and then I went to the tower for my watch. I had a pre-watch tour and took the watch as officer of the deck in the afternoon.

The -- in the process, I was made aware that the AVSDU was out of commission, that it was not fully out of commission as in basically all the equipment is down and out of commission, and there's -- there may or may not be -- diving cannot operate with that piece of equipment out of commission.

It was something that broke that morning, from my understanding, internal process, and since it was such a short duration underway, it would not be fixed until the return to port. There was no official wait and temporary stand order written on how to operate without pieces of equipment out of commission.

What kind of -- the understanding was passed on to me from the person I relieved, which was Lt. Sloane, the navigator. He was the officer of the deck that I relieved, was that basically you spend more time in sonar where that the original -- the AVSDU is just a computer in the control room.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: All right, sir. Feel free to refer to any notes, if necessary.

LT. COEN: Yes. I want to make sure I've covered everything before I move on.

When I took the watch, the ship was diving south. The depth was approximately 650 feet, and we were doing approximately 10 knots due south. The ship was underway for a VIP cruise, and what typically happens for a cruise like this is we show the submarine off to the people riding it, to show them the capabilities. So, what that would involve is on the transit out briefing the guests on the diving gear and actually allow them to dive the ship as watching from the instructions.

Other things that we did, and this included on my watch, was show them -- show them, the guests, I proceeded to open up and let them take a look at it. They could crawl inside it, have their picture taken,

and also allow them to watch shooting water slides. Basically, it's firing the tube with nothing, a slug of water basically.

So, during the first part of my watch, we did evolutions like that, where you open up the tube and have water slides. That evolution required CO permission. So, I contacted the captain as officer of the deck to seek permission for those evolutions.

I've got here in my notes that took approximately an hour to an hour and a half to finish that evolution, and I also have here in my notes that after lunch, I relieved the watch at approximately 11:45 that morning. I mean, that could be verified through the official deck watch of the day.

Also during that time, concurrent with the torpedo tubes being open for inspection and the water slugs, I did simple course changes and depth changes to allow guests under instructions of a qualified watchstander at the helms and point positions to basically drive the ship. These were -- I'm not sure of the exact magnitude of the -- the depth orders I gave, but I think they were changing course from north -- north to south or something like that, and changing depths maybe a hundred-200 feet at a time, which was

small angle of the ship. As one was still going through, I didn't want to unnecessarily disturb the watch at that time.

After those evolutions were complete, I asked where we were and what the kind of plans were for the rest of the afternoon. This is approximately 1:00 in the afternoon now, and at this time, the ship was heading north.

Part of the plan for the day was to involve an emergency blow demonstration and a high-speed angle and turn or angles and dangles when we were -- these evolutions take some time. They're -- where we were at 1300, 1:00 in the afternoon, we were approximately 17 miles from Papa Hotel, which is basically a point we dive to in preparation to dive to Pearl Harbor. It gives you a time and a place for you to be to be in port on time.

17 miles, and we had approximately one hour to be there. If we decided at that moment to drive back to Papa Hotel, and we turned the ship to port, it would require a higher operating bell and would have limited operations to just driving back to -- to Pearl Harbor and not performing the other evolutions that were planned for the day.

I discussed this with the Quartermaster of the watch, the assistant navigator and the navigator, and basically asked for guidance from the navigator, who's a senior officer than I was, on what the planned events were.

My plan for the watch was to drive the ship and carry out the plan of the day during the emergency blow with the angles and dangles. That was not something that I would initiate on my own. So, basically, I informed the navigator of the situation where, you know, we had to cancel some items off the schedule or ship sail back to allow time for these events.

I believe at the time, the second sitting at lunch was finishing up. The navigator discussed the situation with the executive officer and the command officer. I did not formally discuss this with the CO or XO, you know. We had to do one or the other, be late or skip these events.

It was my understanding that the navigator spoke to him. I saw the navigator speak with the XO and CO. I did not listen to their conversation, but I believe it was of the nature of the schedule, and what are we going to do?

At this time, the training officer came into the control room, and on the ship's 1C announced that the ship would be conducting high-speed maneuvers, angles and dangles, and large depth changes and also announced for the guests where the best place to be to observe these events.

At this time, many of the guests came in the control room to witness the depth changes. The control room after that point got very crowded with the number of guests there. I'm not sure of the exact number of guests that were in the control room, but many were there, as well as some other officers from the ward room. The navigator was there. Lt. Pritchett, another officer, was there, and Captain Brandhuber was also present in the control room, as well as the CO and the XO at the time.

The next thing we did was proceed to do the angles, high-speed angles and dangles, and I'm not sure of the exact order of what we did. There were either high-speed course changes or high -- high-speed depth change with large angles.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: If I might interject. If it helps you, we have your course heading coordinates from 22 to 24, if that helps you.

LT. COEN: Okay.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: You can refer to those, if it helps you at all.

LT. COEN: Okay. I don't see speed on here.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. I'm saying it doesn't have the speed.

LT. COEN: Okay. But looking at this -- this reconstruction here, the period, I believe, that we started with is probably in here, and we probably started with high-speed depth changes and then proceeded to course changes here. I may have them backwards, but in any event, we did both of those events, high-speed course changes and -- and depth changes.

Prior to doing the actual maneuvers, I was concerned with the ship's position. Basically, when someone operates, they're assigned a piece of water for submerged operations. For surface operations, they're allowed to operate in that box and also outside that box.

It was my understanding that prior to the high-speed maneuvers, we were approximately five miles from the northern edge of the submerged operating area there that we were assigned. I was concerned with doing

the high-speed angles and maneuvers based on driving very fast at the edge of the boundary. You've got to know exactly where you are and how much time you have or you're going to put yourself in danger of driving outside that area.

So, that was a concern of mine, and I wanted to make sure that, you know, we didn't put ourselves out of area. Also, in this, we were still trying to make our way back to Papa Hotel, although there was never any discussion of that to me from the navigator or the CO or XO, that here's what we're going to do this afternoon. I understand that we're late -- not late but if we want to do everything we want to do, we're going to be late or we're going to abort some of these evolutions.

There was never a discussion of that nature where the plan of events was discussed. Further, I do not know if we were going to request a time shift to return to port or to what extent we were going to go through these evolutions.

I was also concerned with the contact picture. There were, to my knowledge, two contacts that we had north of us and one contact to the south. We had contact information on these ships, but we did not have

a great contact picture of exactly where they were, how close they were, and basically what they were doing.

The contact to the south, he was behind us as we were driving north, and so we didn't have any information on him at the time, and the contact to the north, we had him -- we had information on him, but at the time, we believed they were just in contact.

There was a concern that doing the high-speed angles and dangles would degrade the sonar information we would be able to get on the contacts and possibly even lose contact information. I was concerned to be driving very fast close to the edge of our box and towards contact that we didn't have the best feel for where they were.

I informed the fire control for the watch prior to doing the high-speed maneuvers of the contact to the north, and if an area was closed, that he needed to make that known, that he had to inform myself that there was contact of concern.

I was especially concerned with making sure that person understood they needed to report this. The person I talked to was FT3 Brown, a fairly junior person qualified for FTOW, especially for the watch, and fairly soft-spoken, and so my concern was in a room

that was very crowded, that a junior person working the controls for -- for tracking contacts and a small voice. I wanted to make sure that he understood that I wanted to hear a report from him, if I needed to.

Prior to actually doing the maneuvers, we also made a change at the helm position. The helm is the person responsible for really carrying out the orders from the officer of the deck and driving the ship. He controls the planes and the rudder which determines ship depth and the ship's course, and for high-speed maneuvers, it's a lot of practice and a lot of feel to -- to do it very good and maintain depth and course and not overshoot -- overshoot it. It's very easy to -- to get off depth and get off course during maneuvers.

So, the captain made a decision to change out the helm from someone who was -- someone who was more experienced. Basically, we put our battle stations helm on a watch. He's a battle station helm for a reason. He's the best, and he often gets more practice than others in driving the ship that aggressively in high-speed maneuvers.

So, we -- we waited till we changed him out, and we also asked him when was the last time he had

driven the ship in such a way, high-speed angles and dangles, and his response was, "It's been awhile", and we had been in SRA for most of the Fall, and we had come back from one month at sea, where there was just very little aggressive driving. It was the -- we just didn't do that type of training on that month we were at sea.

Okay. After we changed out the helm, and he responded that "it's been awhile" since he's done such maneuvers, the captain said, "Okay. We'll start off in small increments of angles and dangles."

A lot of these evolutions took place when the CO came in and announced that the ship would be doing this, but there was a delay from the time he actually announced it to the time we actually started.

There was another delay that kind of stopped us from starting angles and dangles, and basically from that, it kind of just, to me, kind of described the situation where there was more time being wasted before we could start back to Papa Hotel and commence the angles and dangles.

There was a delay. After that delay, we finally started the angles and dangles, but it kind of to me tensed the commanding officer and said that he

wanted to immediately get started with the maneuvers and having to change out the helm and the other delay contributed to maybe some frustration there that we weren't starting as soon as he desired.

The depth changes we did, I believe, were from 650 feet to a 150 feet, and we did those, I think we started off with 15-degree angles and increased those up to 30-degree angles, and the speeds, we varied for that between 10 and 15 knots, I believe.

After the depth changes, we came to 400 feet and then increased the ship's speed to our maximum speed, and then from there, we did course changes, and I know between Course 3-4-0 and 1-4-0 degrees, basically right to left course changes.

After the last course change, we were setting up on, I believe, Course 3-4-0 and still slowing down from the last turn. The commanding officer directed me to make preparations for the depth, and that I had five minutes to do that.

The -- I acknowledged the order, and -- let me -- let me go back to the angles and dangles. The -- at the time for the course changes and depth changes, I was located behind the diving officer of the watch, behind the helmsman. The control room was very crowded,

full of those guests, and my sonar indication speed control was broken, and the next set of contact information was over at the screens, which there were several people between me and those screens.

The CO was in the control room, very close to me, so he could supervise the angles and dangles. Some time before angles and dangles, it's typical for some COs to give boundaries of where he wants to operate, stay between these two depths and change depths, this high of an angle or change course using this high of an angle or change course using this to be the letter and allow the officer of the deck to carry out those orders.

What happened here was the CO gave me more direct input on how he wanted the ship driven. He would give me the order as he wanted me to give it to the helm of the dive. In effect, I was repeating his orders and driving the ship off of him. He told me what he wanted me to do, and I carried that out.

So, in effect, all the orders originated from him, and I repeated them to the watchstander. So, all -- - all the -- all the times we changed depth, all the times we changed course, we changed speed, I was following input from the commanding officer. So, there

-- there was not -- so, I was not given the bounds to operate in, to choose my course of action from there, I was following orders from the captain basically on how to drive the ship.

This continued into the periscope depth approach, and the captain ordered me to periscope depth -- ordered me to make preparations for the periscope depth and that I had five minutes. The CO had already told me during the last course change from 3-4-0, and after that, he gave me the order to make preparation, and I was ordered -- and he also directed me to proceed to 1-5-0 feet.

I followed that order, and I went to 1-5-0 feet. At this time, the ship was slowing from a high speed and coming shallow from 400 feet to 1-5-0 feet. The period prior to that effective depth, you perform pretty much an analysis to ensure that you have a clear understanding of the contact picture, the surface contact picture, and ensure that the areas are clear, so you know basically there's no one behind you who can be a threat to you when you're at that depth.

From the CO's standing order, the recommended time per the CO standing order is two-three minutes. Once we -- okay. Also at this time, the contact picture

was very unclear. One reason for that is prior to the high-speed maneuvers, the ship was not ready for motion analysis. So, the contact information we had was not great. We knew we had contacts to the north, but the information we could have had could have been improved.

So, during the high-speed maneuvers, the high speed for one on the sonar performance and (2) it requires, for really good data, that a ship steady to allow contact information to come in and any associated errors of the information to kind of balance out. So, any bearing drift that you would pick up would reflect more accurately.

The way the ship was driven, it was driven for high-speed maneuvers to show how the ship handled. It wasn't driven to receive more data that would be useful for analysis for contact information. So, this further degraded the information we had, but it didn't help the contact picture. We still had data there that was less useful than it could have been if we were steady on course or staying on a speed for a longer period of time.

We also knew that the AVSDU was broken, and I knew that I would be in control of driving the ship and knew -- heard the order to go to depth in five minutes,

knew that was a very rapid amount of time to do that. The standing order says two to three minutes per leg. Following that guidance, you know, that would put us under that amount of time for the two minutes and not allow time to change courses and that would be with a minimum of two legs and that may require more than that if you determine all your contacts or if your data is -- - is not reliable, and you may want to do four more maneuvers.

The XO told me he was going to sonar to aid me because he knew that the ASVDU was broken. I knew I had, you know, his eyes in the sonar. His -- he's our executive officer. He's the person in charge of training on board the ship and plays a big role in my qualifications as a submarine officer. He is trained in the area of the sonar and would know what to look for.

The -- after we were steady on depth at a 150 feet, the commanding officer directed me to change course to, I believe, 1-4-0, maybe it was 1-2-0. So, this was going to be our second leg to -- for target motion analysis. The first leg of data was poor and seeing that based on the reconstruction data that I've seen and the ship data on how long we actually stayed on course and depth.

I believe we were only steady on course and depth for less than -- less than a minute. I think it was maybe 11 seconds. The -- and I think in that time, we weren't steady with speed. So, we were still slowing down throughout this time. We were steady on course for much longer than that, and that's where we saw that we had met this two or three minute requirement. We were steady on -- on course for quite awhile, as we came out of the high-speed maneuvers and steadied up on 3-4-0 or 3-2-0.

However, looking back at the data, we were at high speed. So, information we had was poor. We were changing depth and changing speed. So, the data we got on that leg was -- was poor. I did not change course, I guess, basically of my own independent decision to say, okay, we've been here long enough. I had enough data to see that, to stay on course 3-4-0, to come to a shallow depth and to slow. Then he also directed me to change course to the right.

He -- once we were steady on course, 1-2-0, -- before that, when we were on 3-4-0, the sonar reported the contact picture. We had two contacts to the north, I believe, 13 and 14. On the 1-2-0 course, we had report of contact information, same contacts to

the north, and the data seemed consistent, that these were the contacts we held previously, and were in the same spot we had them for approximately prior to high-speed maneuvers, same bearings.

The -- at this point, the captain directed me to proceed to periscope depth. This was unusual. The way -- normally, if I'm on watch, going to periscope depth or any officer of the deck goes to periscope depth, you drive the ship a certain way, and -- and that information from sonar is his understanding, so he can get a clear contact picture in his head, understanding that information, evaluate it, determine that it is safe to proceed to periscope depth, and this is a good course, and basically know the right way to drive the ship to the surface or periscope depth safely.

Once he has this information, he makes a report to the commanding officer, stating the current ship conditions, the ship depth, speed and course, how he's driven the ship for target motion analysis. It explained the clearance to the right or left or I'm about to clear. He would then report the contact information that he has. I have the following sonar contacts and discuss with the CO the type of contacts

he holds, their bearings, their speed information, and their bearing drift.

Basically, after the officer of the deck gets in his head an understanding of the contact situation, his job is to convince the commanding officer of the same information, to explain to him here's the contact picture, and yes, I do understand it, and it's safe to go to periscope depth, and then the captain will either agree and give the officer of the deck permission to go to periscope depth, after he understands the situation, or he'll say no and direct more target motion analysis or he'll come out to the control room to evaluate himself.

If it's more than one contact, it may be difficult to explain the situation and relative bearing drift of all the contacts. He may come out to ensure that everything looks right prior to proceeding to periscope depth.

It's one of the things the ship does frequently, but it's not a channel issue. It's always a high danger involved going to periscope depth, and so it's not something that the CO did spotlessly, and it's -- it's a training for him to be able to drive the ship in such a way and make that report with confidence to

the commanding officer to allow him to pick up the information to proceed to periscope depth.

Also involved with this, the officer of the deck will ask for information, which will be the sonar, time, steady on this course, report all contacts. Sonar will go through, after they've performed a search of the -- of the sonar area, sonar information and report the contacts they have, and then the course change is very important, that it's a good course change.

The purpose of it is to drive so that good target information, ship information on the contact can be determined, range and speed, and the way the ship is really driving, you know, what the contacts do. If you make a poor decision on how you turn the ship, you're going to get poor information back.

The sonar operators are trained to know what a good course is. The sonar operators are trained what a good course is, and, you know, the officer at that time puts it all together, you know, what courses are good for me to turn to. This may be a good course for target motion analysis but maybe a bad course based on geographic concerns. So, there would be some discussion on the best course to come to for target motion analysis.

During the approach to periscope depth or the preparation, the commanding officer was the individual requesting information from the sonar control room. So, it was not sonar time, which is me, the officer of the deck, asking for the information. It was the sonar captain reporting all contacts. So, in that respect, he was requesting information, and he was receiving information directly.

Now, it was over an amplified circuit, so everyone in the control room could hear it, but the captain was asking for that information, and he was receiving it from the control room -- from sonar, and the XO was also in sonar.

When the captain directed me to proceed to periscope depth, it was unusual because (1) the period prior to, he was directing me on the -- how he wanted the ship driven and what course and what depth, what speed. He also requested the information from sonar directly rather than how it's typically done, where the officer of the deck will request information, and then make his -- evaluate the situation and then independently report it to the commanding officer for his evaluation and then await their permission to proceed.

So, I did not make standard reports to the commanding officer where I reported ship's position, course speed, depth and contact picture and then report -- actually reporting and requesting permission to go to periscope depth on a given course. The commanding officer received that information directly from sonar and then directed me to proceed to periscope depth. So, there was no report there.

Other things that were unusual for the periscope depth approach, the five-minute constraint, is rapid. It was typical to challenge officer of the deck to go to periscope depth rapidly. I think this is for a training basis, to make sure that, you know, in the event of a casualty, an officer of the deck can safely get to his periscope depth and to kind of push him to drive the picture a little faster, to understand the situation, and this was -- you know, in my time on board, this would occur, you know, perhaps from the ward room where the captain would pick up his phone circuit and buzz the officer of the deck and tell him to make preparations for periscope depth, you know, either being time -- basically, you know, how fast can you do it?

Safety, I don't think was ever a concern or

not -- not a concern, where it was to be disregarded. It was just a chance to see, you know, to put a training officer to -- to be factored. When we proceeded to periscope depth in that five minutes, I don't think it was the training to go to periscope depth factor. It wasn't -- there's a time to train for speed. I don't think was it. This was not to check off one of the blocks in my -- you know, my career development. I think this was based on a previous constraints of time, where we were running late, and there was a desire to, given the events of the day, move along.

When the CO directed me to proceed to periscope depth, at no point did I ever believe the ship was in danger. The commanding officer has many years of experience, many years of training, as well as the executive officer. Safety is always a priority. I do not believe the ship was in any danger at the time, and when the CO directed me to proceed to periscope depth, it was my understanding that here's a man with much more experience than I have, much more schooling than I have, and can much more rapidly assess and evaluate information, and that he at no time unnecessarily put the ship in danger, and it makes no

sense that he would unnecessarily put the ship in danger with the chief of staff plus SUBPAC on board, you know, or many distinguished visitors.

So, I did not believe that he was putting the ship in an unsafe position, and my kind of -- my faith in his experience and his additional training as well as the executive officer's in sonar, who directly saw the sonar screen, which was not in the control room, led me to believe that the situation was indeed safe, and the contact picture -- the contact picture allowed for safe periscope depth.

The executive officer was in sonar at the time and kind of in between sonar and control. The commanding officer previously went in sonar to evaluate the contact picture, and the XO and CO were also close to the fire control screens where they could see the contact pictures.

At the time, I did not believe that the ship was in an unsafe position. Looking back on the reconstruction data, I can clearly see where the target motion analysis was insufficient, and -- and the ship was driven poorly prior to periscope depth.

When the captain directed me to proceed to periscope depth, I picked up the 27 C, which is an

amplifying circuit, in the control room and sonar radio and told them proceed to periscope depth. I also tested the early warning receiver. I tested the speaker on the early warning receiver, which would notify me of radar, possibly of a collision threat.

I also tested one of the sonar speakers close in to the -- to the sail, which would be the first part of the ship that would come shallower and most closely give us indications of a close surface contact, and these are the steps to test the depth under any situation.

Also at the time, I asked the guests to step off the conn. There were so many VIPs in the control room, and I told them we're going to be going to periscope depth soon, and I needed them to step off the control -- on the time as I would be raising the periscope, and they would need to be clear of the area.

I then said raising the scope. The diving officer of the watch reported the ship's depth and speed, as he always does, prior to raising the scope, and I raised the scope and tested the early warning receiver. After the scope was raised, I -- I made the report over the open mike, all stations copy? periscope depth.

As I said earlier, I did that over the 27 MC, and I said it was 27 MC, would have been all stations make preparation to proceed to periscope depth. The actual proceed to periscope depth would have been over the open mike since it's attached to the periscope and not free to pick up the microphone for that. I would have proceeded to 6-0 feet, and the ship would proceed to periscope depth.

One of the -- while the ship's going to periscope depth, I'm looking at the scope, at the surface of the water to ensure that the surface is clear, and there were other people in the control room who can't look out the scope, are looking at the perivis of what I see, looking for the same thing. So, at that point, all eyes are -- all trained eyes -- I mean, the VIPs aren't going to know what they're looking at. They may see what we're looking at, but really I'm counting the other people that are watching us look at the perivis, and we're all making sure that the contact picture really is clear.

When the scope broke the surface, I conducted the three rapid 360-degree sweeps of the surface in the low-power mode of the periscope, looking for any collision threat contacts. From the time the ship

leaves periscope -- leaves the periscope depth, it's in control, with the exception of emergency no close contact, and basically everybody's watching the officer of the deck or the scope operator to make sure that the -- that it is safe.

So, I did my pre-sweep and reported no close contacts. This is part of the standard periscope depth approach. It's then followed by a slower low-power search and then alternating high-power searches and low-power searches in different quadrants. What we're looking for there is the no close contact, which means it's safe, or the emergency -- I make the report, no close contacts. Also, there's the -- the ESM operator, who's listening to the radars that are out there, and he will also make a report, no close contacts, or he can report a threat contact. He also reported no close contacts.

The -- after the pre-rapid sweep, I was going to next proceed to the rest of the search routine. The commanding officer interrupted my search routine and took the scope from me immediately after the no close contacts. I did not complete my initial search.

We came in at 6-0 feet initially, and then the commanding officer was on the scope, and he

directed me to come shallower to 5-8 feet. So, then I ordered the deck to come to 5-8 feet. As the CO did his search, I followed him on the opposite side of the periscope and ready at any time to take the periscope back from him when he was completed his search, and when I could, I looked at the perivis to see what he was seeing.

I did not always have a clear view of the perivis because of the people in the control room. When I did my search, I did not see any contacts. I saw no contact, and I saw no contacts that would have been a threat, a collision threat. If I had seen contacts, we would have done an initial observation on that contact and determined if he correlated to a sonar contact or if it was a new contact that previously had been undetected.

I did not see any contacts, and I did not see -- I did not see any contacts during my search, and I did not see any contacts from the perivis when the CO was doing his search.

The CO did several resolutions on the scope and looked down several bearings. Most of those were to the -- to the north where we had contacts with -- existing sonar contacts. Looked down several bearings

and alternated to different powers of the scope for better visual detection of a surface contact.

He did not perform his visual search in the manner that I was trained to perform my visual search. When he took over and did the visual search, I did my visual search, and his was not consistent with the way I was trained. He -- he did not follow standards. He looked down bearings and alternated between different powers, and again the CO is the most experienced submarine officer on board a submarine. He is highly trained and highly experienced.

He has operated a periscope many times, and although this wasn't a standard search, I had no reason to believe that the CO would skip this chance to look for surface contacts prior to doing the emergency blow. The purpose of the periscope depth approach was to ensure that the surface picture was clear, and it was safe to proceed with the emergency blow. So, I had no reason to believe that he would perform a less-than-safe search of the area.

After he was completed with his search, he ordered an emergency blow. Before I do that, I just want to step back. The periscope depth approach, there was also one thing that was unusual for that. The --

typically before going to periscope depth, you have a brief where you discuss why you're going to periscope depth, the safety precautions involved, the surface contacts, your duration of periscope depth, and any evolutions that you may be performing while there.

Also, you would discuss the periscope depth. You would brief the emergency blow. On the emergency blow, certain watchstanders carry out certain actions. You want to make sure that everybody understands the certain actions since it's vital to the safety of the ship. So, those would be important things to cover at that brief.

You'd also cover why you're going to periscope depth. If you're going to transmit messages, receive messages, or conduct other evolutions, you would make sure that you're ready to perform those evolutions, and that you planned the events out so that you would do them in the most efficient manner and the safest manner.

If we had briefed that the purpose of the ship was to -- purpose of the trip to periscope depth was to ensure the safe surface contact picture prior to the emergency blow, there were things that you'd make sure that would happen. You would make sure that you

did have a good picture of the surface picture and that would include a visual understanding of the contacts. So, you'd want to make sure that you had a good visual picture and that would include a long-time periscope depth to ensure that any contacts out there aren't being masked by waves, and that over time, any contacts would average out, you know, to be seen.

So, more time to look for contacts would -- would be important as well as shallower depths to ensure that the visual search is more effective, and it would have been prudent to raise the periscope to get the highest possible look with the periscope and even raise a second periscope so there are more eyes available to ensure that the surface contact picture is clear.

The ESM operator would allow more -- allow him more time to evaluate the radar. Also, to closely look down the bearing of any contact. We had two sonar contacts to the north, and we had sonar bearings on those contacts. We did not look down those bearings explicitly. The commanding officer looked down those bearings, and like I say, he looked approximately down those bearings and changed the power of the periscope, but it wasn't correlated between the scope operator and

the fire control officer for the watch who would have the exact bearing and could assist the scope operator to come left or right as necessary so that the bearing scope operator was looking now with the exact bearing of the surface contact.

That did not happen, but the CO did look down the approximate bearing, but whether it was focused on the exact bearing, it should have been done. The standard pace of depth brief was not held, and these things were not discussed, and this is based on the five minutes of the periscope depth.

After the -- after the captain did his --

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: I'm sorry to interrupt you. Our transcriptionist here would like to -- to take a brief five or 10 minute break.

LT. COEN: That's fine.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: It's probably a good time to do that anyway. So, the time is now about 12: -- no. 10:15. About 10 minutes.

LT. COEN: Okay.

(Whereupon, a recess was taken.)

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. It's about 10:24, after a brief break, and we're back with our interview of Lt. Coen.

Sir, please proceed with -- if you can recall where you left off, go ahead.

LT. COEN: Okay. The ship had just completed its search of periscope depth. I -- my time on the scope was limited to a pre-rapid sweep of 360 degrees as the periscope actually broke the surface.

The CO then took the scope and commenced his visual search. I did not complete my standard periscope depth approach search, and the depth of the ship -- the ship's depth was changed from 6-0 feet to 5-8 feet.

Looking at the reconstruction data, it's questionable to what actual depth the ship finally got to. However, the shallowest depth possible would have yielded the best search, visual search, and a longer search would have allowed for more possible recognition of contacts.

The time actually spent at periscope depth was very short. It was approximately two minutes. The -- there was time for the commanding officer to complete his visual search, and he looked down several bearings. I can't say that they were the exact bearings of pre-existing contacts, but they were not correlated directly.

After the commanding officer was content with

his search and satisfied that the surface picture was clear, he ordered emergency deep. At this point, there was no further chance for anyone to take a look down the existing bearing or had a chance to look at -- look on the periscope.

After the emergency was called, the ship carries out immediate actions to proceed down to a safe depth. The visual search to ensure that the surface was clear was terminated when the commanding officer decided it was safe and ordered the emergency deep.

The emergency deep was -- was not discussed at a prior brief that it would occur. It was not called out because it was a required action that needed to be taken to ensure the safety of the ship, which is what it's intended for. It was called out, I believe, to get the ship down to a deep depth rapidly so that the overall time spent deep would be minimized.

If you knew you would get to that depth, you want to spend as little time deep as possible, because in that time, you effectively are blind, and the surface picture can change.

The emergency deep was not briefed ahead of time. I did not feel that it was called out, as I had done a search, and I had seen no contacts, and the

commanding officer did a search and reported no contacts.

After the ship had carried out its initial immediate actions, the scope was lowered, the captain proceeded -- directed me to proceed to 400 feet. I ordered the dive to proceed to 400 feet, and I slowed the ship down from its initial bell, and I believe I slowed it down to a head standard of approximately 15 knots.

The CO then announced that we were going to be performing the emergency blow and directed me to come left to the -- to the north. He -- actually prior to giving me the -- the order, he asked the quarter master the bearing to Papa Hotel. That would be the next logical point to drive to to return to port. The quarter master gave the captain the bearings at approximately 3-4-0 and then ordered me to Course 3-4-0.

We were still proceeding deep to the ordered depth of 400 feet, and we were -- we were still speeding up slightly. The ship was changing course to 3-4-0. The commanding officer directed certain guests who wanted to perform in the emergency blow to take their station. This had been discussed previously on

what individual actions would be to assist -- excuse me -- there was a guest who actually had the emergency blow levers and also a guest at the helm's position to drive the ship.

The person at the helm was under the supervision of the qualified helms -- the ship's quartermaster and person at the emergency blow levers was under the supervision of the chief of the watch. There was also a person who sounded the diving alarm for the -- for the surfacing.

The -- once the personnel were on station, we were still changing course, but we were on the ordered depth. The captain ordered me to place the rudder mid ship and commence a 10-second emergency blow. So, we were not yet steady on the ordered course, but we stopped where we were in the turn and did the 10-second emergency blow.

The guest counted out loud for 10 seconds as he held the levers and then released them, and then after that, the ship started to ascend. I ordered a 20-degree up angle, and then the commanding officer that was on the 1MC basically narrated this event for the crew and the guests. Basically, he announced the ship was going to commence emergency blow, the tanks were

now blown, and then announcing ship's depth, speed and angles as they changed as we got closer to the surface. Basically narrated then all the way up to the surfacing and the collision.

He described the sensation of what the ship would feel like as it broke the surface, the kind of feeling, the sensation of weightlessness, and I remember that he called that out a little early. You know, he said the ship's now broken through the surface, and there's still several feet to go before you could feel the angle change and the sort of weightlessness feeling.

As the ship broke the surface, there was a loud bang in the control room, and from what I was seeing, which was directly behind me as the officer of the watch, it sounded like it came directly from over the watch, his station. The commanding officer said, "What the hell was that?" And he looked very stressed that something bad had happened.

He -- he attempted to raise the periscope to do a visual search, and at the time, the ship was -- the ship's speed was greater than the operational speed limit for the periscope. I ordered all stop to reduce the speed to less than the limit for the periscope and

reported to the commanding officer when the ship speed was at the limit, and it was safe to raise the periscope.

Once the scope was raised to see out the scope, looking through the perivis, there was a fishing boat behind us, almost directly in front of -- initially, looking through the perivis, the ship looked like it was okay, that it was still -- it did not look damaged.

The commanding officer directed me to come around to the vessel. I increased speed to header approximately 10 knots and came right with the 15-degree rudder. The CO made a 1 MC reciting what the bang was and said that we had apparently had a collision with another ship. He directed the guests to be escorted down to either the crew mess or the torpedo room. I believe it was initially the crew mess, and then they later got moved to the torpedo room, and the crew mess became a station with the crew for -- for the rescue effort.

The navigator, Lt. Sloan, raised the other periscope, Number 1 scope. Now he had both periscopes raised. The commanding officer again directed me to -- to get over there. I think what he said was, "Get over

there, Mr. Coen." I increased speed to a head full and right full rudder to -- to speed up to get over there.

He was a little concerned with -- with the ship. The ship had performed the emergency blow, and it was broached but not technically fully surfaced. Turned the ship rapidly and ordering speed to kind of assist in that turn, I was thinking about the stability of the ship and maintaining the ship surface to ensure that we did not -- we had not yet ensured that all the air -- all the water was out of the tanks and the ship was completely stable, and there was a possibility of losing depth control and (2) possible damage to the periscopes for the speed that was given to try and turn over there.

The -- tried to order the head full and a right full rudder to turn the ship over. The captain then formally took the time from me and said, "I have the conn" or something like that, and I believe I said, "The captain has the conn." The CO then ordered a right full rudder, and either I told him or the helm told him that the rudder was already right full, and then he ordered a right hard rudder.

So, now we were turning back towards the ship. I think at this point, we could see some list in

the ship as we were turning, and the ship was beginning to sink. The chief of staff was in control, and he directed the navigator to get a copy of the reporting requirements to make sure that this was reported properly and immediately.

The commanding officer directed me to have the bridge manned and to continue with surfacing the ship. The formal surfacing procedure ensures that all the water is clear of the main bow and that the ship is stable, and after that period, it's then safe to man the bridge because the ship is stable. As I said, it's clear.

The CO directed me to man the bridge and surface the ship. By -- by the time we had turned all the way around and faced the Ehime Maru, it had -- it had sunk by that point. As soon as we were there, the Lt. Commander Meter had a harness on, and he manned the bridge, and he took station up on the bridge to relieve the officer of the deck.

Initially, right as the ship sunk, I did not see any people in the water or any life boats. We were able to read a name off the ship. I think we saw Fisheries High School and Ehime Maru.

The XO got on the 1MC and basically took

charge of the rescue effort and directed divers to take station and the damage control divers, you know, get ready to -- you know, the diver team and to rig a ladder from the bridge.

At this time, the bridge was being manned. The bridge was manned, and the ship's engineer, Lt. Commander Meter, was ready to relieve the captain and me as officer of the deck. It was -- we manned the bridge very rapidly, prior to completing the normal surfacing procedure. So, there was some -- some risk involved, that the ship was not completely stable with the bridge hatch open.

We felt it was necessary to get people top side to assist in -- in kind of driving the ship and seeing the situation more clearly than through a periscope.

At the same time, the chief of staff and the navigator, maybe both at the same time, got the ship's position for their reporting purposes. Also, the ship's bow planes had to be surfaced. The person on the bridge contacted me in control and told me he was ready to relieve me of the deck and the captain at the time.

After the approval process, which was fairly rapid, pretty much took the ship that had a collision

and were in the process of surfacing, and the surfacing procedures had not been completed yet. He relieved me of the deck and the captain at the time.

At that point, I stationed myself as contact coordinator and started searching the water for any survivors, life rafts or people in the water. I started a geoplot where I plotted, with the assistance of another officer, Lt. Pritchett, the relative position and bearing of life boats and survivors.

I didn't see any other surface contacts out there. The only contact we had was just the life boats and debris from the collision. The officer of the deck was trying to drive the ship towards the life boats to assist them.

I saw about eight life boats. The one life boat close to the bow of the ship that was real close to you, the waves and the motion of the ship, the ship in the waves and the life boat, it made the life boat very unstable close to the ship, and it seemed like there was danger of the ship turning over.

At that point, the officer of the deck kind of drove back away from the life boats to -- to stay clear of them, close to them, but clear that we wouldn't put them in further danger.

I believe I saw approximately eight life boats. We had to take the divers away from the bridge, and the divers on the bridge were ready to go over. We did not open the escape trunk due to waves being washed over and taking water on the ship.

The XO and I talked about putting divers in the water from the bridge, but there was concern about what to do afterwards in getting people back on the submarine, if people were injured. I believe his decision was not to put people in the water or rescue anybody based on that. If they were in life boats, they were safer than if we tried to bring them back on the submarine, you know, through (1) the different motions of the -- of the two ships, the life boat and the submarine, and the potential for further injury there and then trying to move an injured person, you know, up a very unstable ladder and then down a very narrow compartment through the bridge. It would be very difficult, but there were divers ready to go in the water fairly rapidly to assist anybody, if we saw anybody in the water, but everybody that we saw through the periscope, that's where I was looking, I never went to the bridge, were already in life boats.

The commanding officer went to the bridge to

assist up there, and I think he assisted in the reporting on the bridge radio. The diver on the watch was also relieved to assist in the rescue, rescue party, and that basically means stationed as the contact coordinator for approximately 15 minutes.

There was a report of damage to the ship, possible damage to the shaft. As the ship's main propulsion assistant, I went back to investigate for damage, after -- after I was relieved as the contact coordinator by Lt. Pritchett, who had been assisting me prior to that on the geoplot.

After I left the control room to go investigate the damage in the engine room, that pretty much ended my involvement with the recovery effort or any ship-handling/ship-driving responsibilities.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. We'll go ahead and take a break here to change the tape.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. The time is just a couple of minutes before 11 o'clock. And we are back to continue our interview with Lieutenant Cohen.

Sir, if you have any further narrative that you would like to go into or does that complete your --

LIEUTENANT COHEN: I think that completes my

narrative for now.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay.

LIEUTENANT COHEN: The actions after I was relieved -- the events of the collision or the recovery effort.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. Then I guess what we will do now is go onto ask some more detailed questions on some of the events of the afternoon, probably the format we will use each interviewer will ask a series of questions and then when he has pretty much covered the issues or things he has, he will pass it to the next interviewee and then we will go around the room, you know, a couple of times probably, or however long it takes.

So, I will go ahead and begin now with a few questions and then I will pass it, as I say, down to the next person.

Okay. Just going back, when you took the watch you indicated that the ship was going south 160 feet, 10 knots, could you describe --

LIEUTENANT COHEN: I think I said 650 feet.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Oh, I apologize, 650 feet. Could you once again describe the contact picture at

that time and what actions you may have taken shortly you relieved the watch to get a better understanding of the contact picture.

LIEUTENANT COHEN: To the best of my recollection there were three contacts. Two in the northern direction of Oahu and one to the south. The contacts were distance and did not present immediate concern. We were a submarine in deep water, vein? deep and we were not planning on coming shallow any time soon, to my knowledge at that time. So, driving the ship for a great understanding of those contact situations, I didn't feel that there was a need for a highly accurate contact picture at that time. The data we had suggested that the ships were distance and, and it would be expected to have contacts to the north at Oahu. And the contact to the south was not an immediate concern. We had had it for awhile and we were, shortly after I took the watch we turned back towards the north, so driving away from that contact as well.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. You said that since you were deep, you weren't really too concerned about the contact picture. Is that some guidance that you have concerning your aggressiveness in pursuing contact

evaluation or that just some general?

LIEUTENANT COHEN: You know, I think in every other contact you will understand that contact is doing. But, there is a difference in having contact information for tracking and then having, and when I say tracking, just, I mean, for normal ship's operation in driving and ensuring that, you know, contacts stay outside, you know, of a minimum safety range, you know, a buffer that you would like contacts to stay outside of, just, a typical value is 4,000 yards. There has been that and getting a highly refined solution. For example, what a ship a doing is, you know, to the degree course, you know, and to the exact speed. What I am saying is it wasn't one of those situations where we needed to have precise information on the contacts. I am not saying that we were deep and surface contacts were of no concern, I am just saying they are not of such a high concern that we need very highly accurate information about that. The time when we would get more accurate information is prior going to periscope depth, we perform target motion analysis to ensure the contact is very clear and that, not just the, in the portion that we are driving, the portion behind us and our

baffles is clear and understood.

So, at that point the ship was driving for TMA and for a clear understanding of what the contact situation is. And I was handed, the period when I first took the watch was not one of those times where such precise information was required.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: And in making your evaluation of the contact situation or contact picture, did you and I am talking about this particular period of time, did you have a discussion with the sonar people? Did you talk to the fire control technician on the watch? Or did you just kind of look at the displays yourself and independently make the judgements, the analysis of the contact situation?

LIEUTENANT COHEN: Prior to taking the watch, I reviewed the contact situation and I discussed with the center supervisor what contacts he had. And I would have correlated that with the FTOW, make sure the pictures matched. It wasn't a simple walk through where I looked at the sonar screen and said I have the picture in my head and walked through the fire screen, looked at it and said, okay, I have it. There was discussion there. It wasn't an in detail review of all

the possible parameters, you know, okay, this contact here, what is his course, what is his depth, what, you know, what is he, you know, what is this guy doing. It was more a general, you know, what is out there, what they are doing, okay.

And the, typically I would, and I think this is true for most officers, know enough about contacts to stay away from them and ensure that they are not a threat. I typically not have the knowledge that I would have prior to periscope depth that I would report to the commanding officer of the deck. I have these, you know, four contacts, here what they are all, here is what they all doing, and here is what I have been, you know, watching them for this amount time and here is something I will related. I think it would be a little more relaxed then that, where, okay, I know these people are out there, but I don't have the same detail that I have, same detail prior to going to periscope depth.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. We are going to take a brief break here.

(Whereupon, a short recess was taken.)

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: We are ready to go back on.

All right, it is about 12 minutes after 11 o'clock, and we are back on the record with our interview with Lieutenant Cohen.

You had mentioned the schedule that you became concerned about, the schedule being able to complete the angles and dangles and high speed turns, according to the plan of the day. Had you done this series of evolutions before as officer of the deck?

LIEUTENANT COHEN: I had not done this series of evolutions before as officer of the deck in the capacity of a VIP cruise. Just without that, I had not done an emergency blow as an officer of the deck. I had witnessed it, but I don't believe that I had ever done it before just as officer of the deck. And high speed angles and dangles and turns, I am not sure if I had done that before as officer of the deck. I know I had witnessed it before, and I had kind of watched in a qualifying process and it is a pretty interesting thing to be a part of and watch, learning how the submarine works. I had seen it before, and I am not sure that I had ever done it as officer of the deck. But, I had seen emergency blow before and I had seen angles and dangles, but as far as being the officer of the deck

myself, I am not sure.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: And when you do this series of evolutions, the high speed turns and the angles and dangles, are they normally done together as a group or do you sometimes just do the angles and dangles or sometimes just the high speed turns?

LIEUTENANT COHEN: I believe they only done as a group.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay.

LIEUTENANT COHEN: To kind of -- If you were going to drive the ship aggressively, they kind of go and do all aspects of that.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. And is there some kind of rule of thumb of how many depths excursions or what you would do or how many high speed turns you would do and how long that complete set of evolutions would take? Because you say, you became concerned about the schedule, did you have an idea how long it would take to do that?

LIEUTENANT COHEN: No, I did not know how long it would take. In my experience when it has been done, it is, it has been done for practice and training and once it has been shown that, okay, the people know how

to do it and they can consistently maintain depth, or maintain control of the ship, you know, within a tight depth band, then they performed satisfactorily. If they have some trouble with depth, they may continue the evolution until they get a better feel for how to respond to the ship. So, it was always kind of for training. At this point it was more done to show the visitors how the ship can drive. And it was not a real, it wasn't really a training evolution for these men. It was more of, to show the capabilities of the ship. So, if the ship did very good, they may have stopped early. If the ship had done very poorly, they may not have continued until the ship mastered it. They may have just said, okay, there is an example and carried on from there.

There never was a standard program or outline of here is what angles and dangles are and here is the procedure you follow or the outline and here is standard times for this evolution.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. You mentioned that at some point in this time frame you had requested that FT3 Brown report any close contacts. Was FT3 Brown, was he the fire control technician of the watch when you

relieved the watch or -- Could you describe who was actually manning those consoles during your watch period?

LIEUTENANT COHEN: There was FT3 Brown and FT1 Seacrest control room. On that day to the best of my knowledge, FT3 Brown was in control of the watch. FT1 Seacrest was the person designated on the watch bill and he was the person who I guess was really the FTOW. When I spoke to FT3 Brown, I don't recall FT1 Seacrest being there at the console. I remember he was in the control room at times, but, to my knowledge Brown was the operator and Seacrest was not. I later found out that Seacrest was the operator and Brown was there. So, I am not sure how that happened. If that was, if Brown had relieved for a head break or some other, you know, temporary break or what. When I had spoke to FT3 Brown, he acknowledged, he knew what I was saying. He understood that if there was contact, he would report it. And his behavior was consistent with someone who has the watch. He wasn't like surprised that I was talking to him in the capacity of someone who needs to report contacts to the Officer of the Deck. So, if he was not on watch, and was just in the control room, I

would have expected something like, "You need to talk to Seacrest, I am just up here doing something else." He did not behave that way so, to the best of my knowledge, he was the operator that day and I can't really explain why that wasn't really the case.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. Would it be standard routine for the fire control technician of the watch, if he were to be relieved, to request your permission to be relieved and make that report or what is your procedure on that?

LIEUTENANT COHEN: The standard procedure is for any person who desires a watch relief, for whatever reason, to, there is an internal process where they understand the contact situation, understand the possibilities whether it is a -- operator or a sonar, I don't control the watch reliefs of the actual sonar operators, that is up to the sonar supervisor. But, I control the watch relief. The sonar supervisor, FTOW, quartermasters, and the dive and the helm. The chief of the watch reports to the dive and the stern planes reports to the dock. But, the watch reliefs I control and I require and that they get permission to turn over. And it is possible that the two individuals

cannot do the turn over without my permission and just turn it over. I am not sure if that is the case or not. I have had problems in the past with that occurring and I have done my best to stop that and enforce a standard where a turnover permission is granted and it is not carried out at their level.

So, if that occurred, I was unaware of it. I did not grant permission for it. And I certainly don't approve of that behavior, although I have seen it in the past with FTOWs.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Could you tell me about how long you have been qualified or had been qualified as an officer of the deck and how many watches as an officer of the deck you had stood prior to February 9th?

LIEUTENANT COHEN: I had reported to the ship in March of '99 and part of my standard qualifications is to qualify in the engine room and then qualify for, with diving officer watch and officer of the deck. The officer of deck surface and submerged. I qualified officer of the deck in Summer of 2000. When an Eastpack deployment two months over June, July of 2000, where we went to San Diego and San Barbara. We spent

the 4th of July in San Barbara. I qualified officer of the deck in June on that deployment. And then approximately a month later, I qualified in submarines on that same deployment. I had qualified officer of the deck surface prior to that. I am not sure of the exact date of that qualification. But, qualified, excuse me, in June of 2000. We were at sea for June, July of 2000, following that sea period, we returned to Pearl Harbor, and commenced an SRA maintenance period for approximately four months.

After that period was over, we went to a sea trials period for a couple of days to verify the systems that were worked on. I was not onboard for that sea trials. The period of the maintenance period extended into the holiday stand down and several people on the boat already had preapproved leave to fly back to family in the Mainland. And the ship honored those previous arrangements, so I was on leave when the ship went on sea trials.

After the holiday stand down period, the ship went on another Eastpack deployment for approximately one month. And then returned back on February 2nd and the following week we had the collision. So,

approximately three months of sea time as officer of the deck, I submerged. There was not an emergency blow done during that period that I was on watch for. There was an emergency blow done for the maintenance that was done in the Fall at the end of the maintenance period. And there was no, none that I recall, any high speed angles and dangles driving that I was officer of the deck or witnessed during those three months.

That is about my experience as officer of deck.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: I was actually trying to get a more definitive idea of how many times you actually stood the OD watch. So, you say were the main propulsion assistant. So you had to stand engineering watches as well as deck watches. And how frequently did you stand the officer of the deck watch?

LIEUTENANT COHEN: On the Eastpac when I qualified, I stood a watch, I believe, more frequently. You have to forgive me, this is over a year ago. But, I was newly qualified and the command allowed me to stand that watch to give me room to grow and learn after I was qualified. So, in that two month period, assuming a four section watch -- to give you a formal number, a

four section watch you stand one watch a day. We were at sea for two months. There was liberty ports involved. But, I am not sure of the exact number.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay.

LIEUTENANT COHEN: The Eastpac in January, I don't believe I stood as much officer of the deck, but, I can't really remember. There was also liberty ports involved there. And the real purpose of that Eastpac was not training. It wasn't time for ODs to stand watch and train. It was more of a, it was more maintenance related to the work that they had done in the Fall. There wasn't -- There wasn't much training value, I would say, in that time period. There wasn't much tactical training where the ship is driven restfully.

CAPTAIN KYLE: This is Captain Kyle, could you just estimate 20 watches, 50 watches, for you, including, including your training time that you were working, standing JOD -- Just give the numbers here, kind of a feel for how many watches you stood by February? Just, you know, a dozen, two dozen, what is your --

LIEUTENANT COHEN: I will guess maybe 20 to 40 watches. I don't want to put a lot of weight in that

answer. This was a long time ago and I am not too confident in that number.

CAPTAIN KYLE: Okay. Thank you.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: You mentioned that before the start of angles and dangles there was a delay. Could you if possible go into a little bit about that and the circumstances?

LIEUTENANT COHEN: I am really can't go into more details of that. It is of a confidential nature. What I can say it is something the CO was aware of. There was an evolution progress that he granted permission for, that had to run to completion. And --

CAPTAIN KYLE: This is Captain Kyle, again, is that a propulsion point chemistry issue sampling?

LIEUTENANT COHEN: Yes, sir.

CAPTAIN KYLE: You can't go into, I don't want to go into specific details because it would, it is an evolution in propulsion point they were doing, specifically has to do with the reactor maintenance that is required. Try to do it at steady power. You don't want to jinx the bell a lot when you are doing this evolution. It is just a sampling procedure according to the propulsion point was in progress at

the time. Does that answer your --

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Yes, and I would like just for Lieutenant Cohen just to confirm what you said as to your understanding.

LIEUTENANT COHEN: Yes, Captain Kyle is correct on what I am talking about. The evolution was something that the Commanding Officer had information for and it was in progress and that what made us move into the angles and dangles and the evolution was terminated early to proceed with angles and dangles. Okay.

(Pause.)

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: During the high speed turns and angles and dangles you were positioned, I believe you stated near the helm, and the Captain was near by you and you were directly supervising the, I believe you said you were supervising the watch of the helmsman, stern plainsman, is that correct?

LIEUTENANT COHEN: Yes, that is correct. I stood behind -- of the watch, who was directly behind the helmsman and stern plainsman. Right there at the shift control panel where I can watch what the operators are doing and watch what the ship is doing

and ensure the ship is being operated safely.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. Did you at any time during angles and dangles and high speed turns go over to the fire control console or in the sonar to have a look at the contact picture?

LIEUTENANT COHEN: No, I did not, not during angles and dangles. At that time my attention was focused on the control party and even if, at the time there was a report from the engine room over the, maybe it was sonar, I believe it was -- room and I was going to acknowledge that and that order per request –

(Pause)

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Had you done this series of evolutions before as officer of the deck?

LT. COEN: I had not done this series of evolutions for -- as officer of the deck in the capacity of a VIP cruise. Just without that, I had not an emergency blow as officer of the deck. I have witnessed it, but I don't believe that I have ever done it.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay.

LT. COEN: The training officer directed me

to drive the ship. This is what I was to focus my attentions on. Someone else was going to drive into port. He directed someone to do that. He directed me to drive the ship and focus my attention there. He was with supervising me, supervising them, to make sure that I knew where I needed to be at the time.

Angles and dangles is not the time to -- to figure out what your contacts are. If you want to figure out what your contacts are, you do that through deliberate target motion analysis, and these maneuvers were not for target motion analysis. So, even if I was to monitor the data at that time, so it would be poor data and not yield great results.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. So, after you had completed the high-speed turns, I believe you stated that the captain ordered and the final course was 3-4-0, and he had given you five minutes to ascent to periscope depth, and you had five minutes.

Had he ever done that to you, given you that sort of a -- a time -- a timed guidance for proceeding to periscope depth?

LT. COEN: I cannot remember a previous occasion where he gave me a time constraint to get that done in. I do remember a pre-assigned where I had to

make the calculations rapidly, and I was being timed to see how fast I could do it. I can't remember a specific time that he directly said, you know, five minutes or seven minutes or 10 minutes. Maybe more of the flavor of make preparations for periscope depth and go, you know, I'm timing you, something like that, and I know he did that for me as well as at least two other officers of the deck, you know, their training.

So, it wasn't the first time I had ever done something like that. It may have been the first time I ever had five minutes, but it wasn't the first time that maybe someone challenged it to get it done rapidly.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: So, you do recall that you had been challenged to do something swiftly. Do you remember what sort of time, if you were timed, what -- how long it took you to -- to do it in the past? Any -- any recollection of any numbers on -- on that?

LT. COEN: Approximately 10 minutes, maybe a little faster, maybe a little slower. It really depends on the contact situation. I mean, if you're in an open ocean situation with no contacts, it's very easy, you know, and it gets progressively harder the more contacts you throw in there. Even with one, it's fairly

easy, but if you get two, and their geometry is difficult, it could be very difficult. If you had two and the geometry is easy, it could be as easy as one, if they're doing the same thing.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: And how did you feel when you -- when the captain had given you that -- that guidance, five-minute guidance? Did you think it was unreasonable or did you think it was achievable?

LT. COEN: I believed it was achievable. I believed it was rapid and rushed, and I was tense and excited basically to be challenged like this and kind of the -- under pressure to get it done with a room full of VIPs and the chief of staff on board in the same room kind of watching me.

At no time did I feel that it could not be done or that if we did it, it would be unsafe for sure. I thought the captain and the XO with their experience and their assistance could more easily assimilate the data and evaluate it and make that rapid trip to periscope depth.

It's not something that I would do on my own, if I was the officer of the deck, and, you know, I would never ask the captain to -- for permission to go to periscope depth after five minutes of target motion

analysis, and if I did attempt that on my own without the challenge to go to periscope depth as fast as you can, I think that request would have been denied just on the time factor, from the CO, the XO, and I think it would have met resistance from all the trained watchstanders from sonar and fire control who do that.

It's not a natural thing to do it that fast, and you did this in training to feel comfortable to do things while you're in training, and from the people in sonar and the fire control guys, that's not how it's done typically, and unless there was the mandate from the CO that you get it done that way, there would be some questions there, I think.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Did you feel that that was pretty much a strict number, that if you did not achieve that five minutes, that you would face some --

LT. COEN: No, I did not. I did not feel that that was a hard limit. I thought that was a goal, and -- and I didn't feel that any punishment or negative action would be taken against me if I did not meet the requirement.

What we're really talking about is taking the ship from a safe position through an unsafe position, the time from a 150 feet to periscope depth. The sensor

information, you know, is degraded, and there could be a quiet contact out there that we're not aware of and be a collision threat.

So, it's a safety of ship issue, and I did not feel that negative action would be taken against me if I spent more time following those procedures and being -- ensuring the safety of the ship. I'm a more deliberate officer of the deck or just general officer than most of my peers. I do things slower, and I take more time to do things, and maybe that's some of my general nature, maybe that's just some of my mental capability forces me to assimilate things and understand things and carry on from there, but with the ward room as a whole, I fall into the slower of the group, the more deliberate, and I think the commanding officer was aware of that when he gave me the time constraints, and he kind of proceeded to push things along because he knew I was the officer of the deck than I would have done them on my own.

He ordered the course changes through me. He ordered me to go to periscope depth prior to me making my standard report. He ordered -- he requested the information from sonar rather than having myself do that, and, you know, he imposes the time constraint. He

interrupted my standard periscope search routine prior to me completing it.

He ordered emergency deep prior to me taking another look out the scope for the contact. He ordered the deck to 5-8 feet through me. It could have been a shallower depth, but I think I'm a little more deliberate, slower, however you want to say it, but these were pushed along maybe for the reason that I was, you know, the guy that day as officer of the deck as opposed to someone else, a department head with maybe more experience driving the ship and more training who could do things maybe faster or another junior officer who could -- who would drive faster.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: So, going back again to that -- around the time that the commanding officer issued the five-minute guidance to you, you didn't know what was coming next, other than you needed to prepare the vessel to -- to surface within five minutes. You didn't know that the commanding officer was going to give you a course change order.

So, during that period that you were on the 3-4-0 course, what -- what did you do? Could you describe your activities? I think the two minutes that you were on that course, what were you doing in those

two minutes?

LT. COEN: After he ordered me to make preparations for the periscope depth, and I had five minutes, I kind of stepped back and gathered my thoughts. Okay. Slow down, think about what I'm really doing because we had just received permission for a very rapid period of course changes and depth changes. Basically, it all went pretty fast. As soon as we -- we did course change steady on course, a new course change came, and basically I repeated the orders as it came from the commanding officer.

At this point, I kind of transitioned to okay, let's stop, think about what we're doing here, what the contacts are, and how to proceed, you know, get my sensors right, adjust the volume on the early alarm receiver, adjust the sonar speaker to listen to the sail, allow the ship to steady out on depth and course and speed and establish an area for me to operate in on the CON that's free of VIPs and guests, so that I can kind of have free roam where I need to have free roam and not be impaired in motion by other people.

That's kind of what I started thinking. The CO ordered me to 1-5-0 feet and speed. The XO told me

to join him in sonar to get the sonar picture. I didn't have the ASVDU, but I was going to get things ready over on the CON reception area, and the CO ordered me to change course to 1-2-0. That was prior to me feeling that I had what I needed to change course.

The CO obviously felt that he had what he needed on that leg to change course, the information that he required. Again, I had never attributed that to unsafe behavior. It was more of here's a man with much more experience, much more training, and he can better evaluate the situation than I can, and if he feels he has enough, then he must have enough.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. So, during that couple of minutes that you were on the 3-4 leg, you pretty much were on the com, on the raised platform, by the periscope?

LT. COEN: Yes.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Did you look at the fire control displays during that time?

LT. COEN: I did look at the fire control screens. I'm not sure if it was on that 3-4-0 leg or the next leg, but I did walk over and look at the contact picture.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. Did you go in the

sonar during that 3-4-0 leg?

LT. COEN: No, I did not go in sonar.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Did the executive officer say anything to you while -- while he was in sonar during that 3-4-0 leg?

LT. COEN: No. The executive officer told me he was going into sonar to assist me because the ASVDU was out of commission. I never received any feedback from the executive officer while he was in there on what was out there, what contacts he saw and his interpretation of that data.

The information I received from sonar was the report the sonar supervisor gave to the commanding officer after he requested that information over the amplified circuit. I didn't necessarily expect a report from the XO on the contact situation. I did expect a report if there was stuff that he felt was unsafe. I didn't expect a report from him if the data on the contacts was safe, and we had a safe trip to periscope depth, and I wouldn't have expected that.

I only expect a report from him if his extra experience, his extra training saw something there that was unsafe, and I assumed that since, you know, he's trained in the way of sonar and has experience, if he

doesn't make a negative report, that it's safe.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. Do you recall what the commanding officer was doing during this couple of minutes at 3-4-0? What his activities were? Could you describe those?

LT. COEN: I think he walked into the state room for a little bit, walked in sonar and looked over the fire control, and then ordered me to change course to 1-2-0.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. And what's your standard rudder for changing course? What rudder did you order at that -- to change course?

LT. COEN: The degree rudder?

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Correct.

LT. COEN: I believe 15 degrees.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. And that's what you normally order to change course like that?

LT. COEN: Yes.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: At that speed? Okay. So, that took a little while to come over to the new course of 1-2-0, and then you steadied up on 1-2-0, and then -- then what did you do, if you recall? What -- did you take a look at the fire control screens then or did you go into sonar?

LT. COEN: I did not go into sonar. I believe I looked at the fire control screens.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. Were there visitors, distinguished visitors standing in front of the screens? Did you have any trouble --

LT. COEN: Yes.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: -- getting to them or --

LT. COEN: There were people in the way of the screens. There were people all the way around the CON and even some people on the other side of the CON, near Number 1 periscope, and people along the row of chairs behind the fire control screen. I didn't have free access all the way over there. I got close enough where I could look at the contact picture, and I saw the fire control screens.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. And during this time, the XO didn't say anything to you or did he regarding --

LT. COEN: No, the XO made no reports to me on the sonar contacts.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: At any time or -- or during this leg, is that correct?

LT. COEN: No.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay.

LT. COEN: Not that I recall.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay.

LT. COEN: He may have made a report to me. I do not recall that.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. Do you remember looking at the fire control technician, if you can visualize him, who it was? Did you have any conversation with him or did he say anything to you during that 1-2-0 leg?

LT. COEN: I know Petty Officer Seacrest was sitting at one of the screens. I believe Petty Chief Brown was sitting at another one of the screens closer to the CEP. I don't recall a conversation with Petty Officer Seacrest.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: And if you can recall, what was the captain doing at this time, during the 1-2-0 leg? Was he -- could you recall what he was doing?

LT. COEN: I believe he stepped in sonar and then stepped back out and looked at the first fire control screen as he comes out of sonar, and then I think he said something like I have a good feel for the contact picture and then directed me to proceed to periscope depth.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: All right. Now, can you tell

us what the fire control displays were at that time, and what the typical arrangement, if there is one, you know, what displays on which console and where the operator would normally sit?

LT. COEN: The furthest aft console was the ops summary display, which is an overhead display of the ship and all the contacts relative to that. The first or most forward contact -- display would be the line of sight which is for one giving contact and shows relative courses of each ship to each other.

There were two consoles that are split up between whatever contact we were tracking to clear it from the second or the third from the -- from forward for one -- for the second from the aft. That would track the contacts and the second from forward would display time-bearing mode which showed the bearing drift bang rate for a given contact or all contacts over time.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: And which -- which of the displays did -- did you look at typically or feel you were most comfortable looking at or found most useful in -- in doing your analysis with the contacts?

LT. COEN: The time-bearing mode, which is useful for bearing rate, which is very useful for

getting a good feel for the contacts range and then also the -- the mate mode which is used for tracking, and you could see how the sonar data generates compared to -- compares to a generated fire control solution.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: You're talking --

LT. COEN: It's the data match dot stack. You can be fairly confident that the solution's fairly accurate.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. And where would the sonar -- where was the sonar operator seated? At which position?

LT. COEN: The fire control operator?

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Correct. I'm sorry.

LT. COEN: FTC Brown was in the most forward seat close to the CEP, I believe, and Seacrest was on the main console, which would be a third from forward. He may have been at the fourth from forward or much further aft where he could easily adjust either console from that one position.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: When the XO went into sonar, he mentioned to you that he was going to go in to help you. Did he also make the comment to the CO or a gesture or did the CO ask him to go into sonar or was there any interaction between the XO and the CO, I

guess, is what I'm asking?

LT. COEN: The XO told me he went in sonar to help me out based on the ASVDU being out of commission. If the XO and CO had a discussion, I was not aware of that. I did read in Commander Waddle's testimony from the preliminary inquiry that he ordered the XO to go in there.

I don't recall that from control from that date. I don't recall the CO ordering the XO to go in there or them having discussion in that, you know, you need to be in there, or just a discussion. I'm not sure if that happened or not. I did read that, but I can't confirm it from that day.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. It's going on 12:00. I think we probably need to break for lunch at this time, Captain Kyle.

CAPTAIN KYLE: I think that's a good idea.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. So, what, about an hour for lunch?

CAPTAIN KYLE: We can make it as short as possible. What's the most reasonably short lunch we could take with everybody feeling comfortable?

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. Let's at this time go off the record.

(Whereupon, at 12:00 p.m., the interview was adjourned, to reconvene at 1:00 p.m.)

A F T E R N O O N S E S S I O N

1:05 p.m.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. The time is now about five minutes 1:00, 1500. The date is the 27th of September, and we're continuing our interview of Lt. Coen. Again, my name is Tom Roth-Roffy.

Okay. I think probably the last thing we talked about was the set-up on the sonar displays.

LT. COEN: On the fire control screens.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: I'm sorry. The fire control screens, and you went through and listed how they were on that particular day.

Now, is that the usual set-up? Is there a standard arrangement for these fire control displays?

LT. COEN: Yes. I mean, the way they were set up that day was typical of how they're set up every day, and that's for ease of the operator, and if he wants to look at a certain screen, it's always there.

However, any console can be selected to display any screen. So, there's nothing requiring that set-up. It's a typical set-up, and it's easy to maintain that way.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. And does it vary from officer of the deck to officer of the deck, personal preference, or the captain has a certain preference or is it pretty much the standard for the whole boat?

LT. COEN: It's pretty much standard for the whole ship, the way -- and it's trained that way. The officer of the deck and fire control officer are trained that way.

At times, it would change as if we were doing more target motion analysis on contacts of interest or multiple contacts, and in that case, even a battle station situation, we would have more than the traditional what-to-watch watchstanders. We'd have kind of a whole party up there, one person per console and a direct supervisor. These could the chief of the weapons officer or the XO, depending on how they planned the watch that day, or the -- what kind of experience they wanted behind it.

Except for specialized and we need to watch for attention on certain contacts, that's -- that's built in, you know, from the ship in all aspects when the ship goes to heightened sense, you know, of -- of mission, battle stations. You put your best people in the best places, and basically the whole division would

be on watch or in key positions, but for routine operations, you're not going to have everybody on a station.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Were you surprised on the 3-6-0 leg -- 3-4-0 leg, correction, when the commanding officer directed you to change course to 1-2-0 with -- did you think you had enough time on that particular leg or what was your -- if you can recall what your thought was?

LT. COEN: I would have preferred to make the decision to change course on my own, after my own evaluation of the data, and allow for me to interpret the information at my rate and then decide the next course, whatever that would have been, not necessarily the course we came to.

I was a little surprised when the officer of the deck -- the captain directed me to change course. I felt that he, you know, he was kind of driving the ship at that point, and he had been kind of driving the ship since before then, during the angles and dangles, when he gave me the courses and depths and speeds he wanted to drive.

But I felt that there must have been enough there for him to see and feel comfortable with, with

his experience and training. He must have saw something there that I didn't see, and so I assumed that he had enough information for him to feel comfortable.

If I was driving by myself, no one else in the room, you know, the CO wasn't actually there and the VIPs weren't there, you know, or even if they were, and I was driving the way I would drive without inputs, I would have stayed on that course longer just to get the picture and then determine which way I wanted to turn.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. You were on that 3-4-0 leg a couple of minutes, was it?

LT. COEN: We were on the course for a couple of minutes. We were -- I'm not sure if we were ever steady in speed. I think we were slowing down from the high-speed angles the whole time, and we were only staying on depth for a very, very short amount of time. I think maybe 11 to 15 seconds steady on depth.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: How did you gauge the amount of time that had passed when you were on the leg? You say it was standing orders to give you guidance of two to three minutes. How do you -- how do you know when those two or three minutes have passed or is it just when you feel comfortable with it?

LT. COEN: There are several ways to do it. Probably the easiest way is to look at the ASVDU. It's a waterfall display of bearing data over time, and there's increments on that scale for how much time you have of time history.

So, it's real easy to see how long you've been on course, how long you've had data on the contact and to know how much time has elapsed. You can also see this information from fire control. Sonar gets continuous data pretty much and not to overwhelm the operator, he kind of filters that out. So, based on some parameters in the fire control system, you can expect basically a dot on the fire control screen, you know, for a certain amount of time, and by just looking at the number of dots you have, you can determine how much time you've been on course. But it's also a feel situation.

If you're getting the data, you can look at it and say, okay, I've watched, you know, this trace move around a little bit, and okay, now I know where it's going, and it looks pretty steady. Basically long enough for you to feel like you've got good data, but without the ASVDU, you're kind of hindered there and that's a priority sensor, so some of it, you know,

would go back to feel and being steady on the given course, not depth and not speed, would have made me feel like you were actually steady longer than you were.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: So, the fact that you were not steady on depth and speed, did that affect the quality of the -- of the contact solution?

LT. COEN: Yes, it did. It -- the fire control system can contract the ship's speed, and if the ship's not steady on speed, it's smart enough to figure that out. As an operator, looking at the fire control screens or the sonar, it's harder to do that in your head, to subtract the speed and look at a bearing rate and say okay, this is the true bearing rate. It's easy to do that when everything is constant, and you can take the curve and say okay, this is what it's based on.

If you're changing one of the parameters, it's very difficult on the operator. The fire control system would be more accurate, but the fire control system's basically an average of lots of things. It's for all given planners. So, the best way to measure bearing rate would be off the time-bearing mode with the cursor that would line up the bearing over time,

and if you wanted to match that into your data, it would average the best speed and the best overall course. So, it will affect solutions.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. I'm going to pass it on to the next interviewer, Mr. Dennis Crider, and I'll review my notes and give Dennis a chance to ask a few questions.

Dennis, if you're ready?

MR. CRIDER: I'm ready. I have a couple -- couple question going to -- going back to your -- to your narrative this morning.

You stated that you were concerned about the operational -- operation being close to the operation box edge.

LT. COEN: Right.

MR. CRIDER: Was this something that -- did you -- was this -- did -- did you discuss this with anyone or was this just something you kept in mind as you were, you know, working through the evolutions?

LT. COEN: I discussed with the quartermaster that I wanted to know where we were with respect to the edge of the box. I never formally to the captain, we need to be careful, we're close to the edge of the box, but I in a loud voice from behind the dive kept on

requesting how much distance and time we had left on a given course from the quartermaster, and he responded what it was at the given time for speed, how much time we had left in the submerged box.

So, anyone who understood what I was asking, it would have been apparent to them how much -- you know, what the concern was and how close we were to it. So, I feel that the commanding officer was made aware by -- by hearing my request to know the distance left and -- and would have been made aware of that by the response from the quartermaster.

MR. CRIDER: Physically, where was the CO at the time?

LT. COEN: During the angles and dangles, he was beside me. He was on the con, and I was behind the dive, dive officer of the watch.

MR. CRIDER: Okay. You also mentioned and you had discussed a little bit before that you were concerned with the contact picture early on. You mentioned the one contact north and one contact south.

Do you have a number to associate with those contacts?

LT. COEN: Based on the reconstruction data I've seen, I know that we had the collision with the

Ehime Maru, Sierra-13. There was only contact with 14. The contact to the south, I'm not sure what that designation was, maybe eight or 10. The other contacts, I'm not sure of the number.

MR. CRIDER: Thank you.

I didn't mean to cut you off. Did I?

LT. COEN: No.

MR. CRIDER: All right. So, let's see. My notes have kind of been superseded a little bit by the discussion. I was going to ask you about when Seacrest took over, whether he got the -- was also told that he should keep you updated on the contacts, but I don't know. Do you think Brown would have told him what your orders were or --

LT. COEN: I would have hoped he would have. I'm not confident that he did express the same concern that I had in the turnover.

MR. CRIDER: But then again -- well, Seacrest, would you have any worry regarding the similar orders --

LT. COEN: I would have -- Seacrest had more experience. He's first class. He knows his job. I would have felt less need to explain the situation to him and explain the need for him to speak up, based on his

experience. I probably still would have had the same conversation with him to just make my point known, probably with the same emphasis I used with Petty Officer Brown, in that he was very senior and soft-spoken.

MR. CRIDER: Okay. And I'm not sure whether this was covered in here or not. As I said, some of this is going to be repetitive but just to make sure we cover it.

The CO, you mentioned the CO gave direct input on how the ship was to be driven. Had he done that before? Were you pretty much --

LT. COEN: Yes. It was very typical for him to drive the ship that way during angles and dangles. It wasn't specific to me as a junior officer, officer of the deck. He did that with department head officer of the deck. He felt that series of events, those maneuvers, angles and dangles, were -- they were risky maneuvers. They were aggressive maneuvers. They're not typical ways to drive the ship, and the ship's designed to drive that way. It's just not routine, and when the ship was driven that way, no matter who was the officer of the deck, the CO was really the one driving the show, giving orders to the officer of the deck, and

that was frustrating to the officers of the deck, frustrating to me, frustrating to the department heads.

It didn't give them the room to drive the ship themselves really, you know. It would have been different if the CO would have given limits, you know, stay within these depths, these angles and dangles, and, you know, I'm ready for your next maneuver, okay, I'm ready for your next maneuver.

If you do control at that level and still maintain some oversight, without directly giving the orders, as basically another officer of the deck, with the two officers of the deck repeating the same verbatim order.

MR. CRIDER: After the angles and dangles, the question goes to the periscope evolution. I think you said that he was pretty much running that show as well.

LT. COEN: Yes.

MR. CRIDER: Was that -- had he done that before?

LT. COEN: No. I can't recall him ever driving the ship, so to speak, for periscope evolution, unless he had the com, which was very rare. The only time the captain ever had the CON was in a battle

station situation for like a tactical training certification, where the CO was the guy driving the ship to shoot weapons or anything like that.

That's the only time I've seen the captain have the con, and it was never, to my recollection, driving it to periscope depth. It was always something else. The periscope depth evolution is a very important one. It's not routine, but it's frequent. It was always standard for me as an officer of the deck and standard with most officers of the deck to -- to drive the ship, make the standard report, request permission, and then the CO was the ultimate authority, unless you went to periscope depth. He granted permission, and he had, I guess, to step back, you know, with some oversight there and the bigger picture. Him driving the ship itself kind of removes him from that oversight of the bigger picture.

No, I hadn't seen that before for going to periscope depth.

MR. CRIDER: Okay. Do you have anything that might help us understand why he did it this time?

LT. COEN: I think it was time constraints. I think he was rushed to carry out the events of the day, and we didn't want to waste any more time, and we

didn't want to waste any more time getting to periscope depth.

MR. CRIDER: Okay. Give me a second while I try to understand why I made this mark on this particular note.

(Pause)

MR. CRIDER: I don't understand why I made that mark.

Now, the XO and the CO were close to fire control screens, you said, at one point or should have been able to observe them?

LT. COEN: Yes.

MR. CRIDER: They should have been able to observe them during the period. There was one point after the -- after the close call. You said you didn't have a clear view of the pyramid. I was wondering, what were -- where were you at the time when you were -- right after the periscope, did you say on the CON or --

LT. COEN: After I did my three rapid sweeps, --

MR. CRIDER: Go ahead.

LT. COEN: -- I had to get my periscope search team. The CO took the scope and altered my

routine, did his own search, and basically I followed him around the periscope. So, he was on the periscope looking into it, and I was on the opposite side basically just shadowing him. So, if he turned, I turned with him, and I was directly opposite him on the CON the whole time.

MR. CRIDER: So, it was a matter of certain times, you were pointed in the direction that you could see the perivis, and at other times, you were not?

LT. COEN: That's correct.

MR. CRIDER: All right. Very good. But at this time, there were no -- well, there were no distinguished visitors in your way at that time?

LT. COEN: There were no distinguished visitors in my immediate vicinity on the CON that I could not see when he turned, but there were immediate -- there were distinguished visitors on the CON next to Number 1 periscope and along the way by the fire control screen. So, there was distinguished visitors in my way of view of the perivis.

The perivis isn't as big a screen. It's only about this big, and it sits off, you know, about shoulder height in the control room. So, it's not an unobstructed view by any means. Even with the uncrowded

control room, it can be difficult to see.

MR. CRIDER: Okay. I'm going to seque into that. Generally, where were the guests located during, you know -- where would they be? I mean, you were mentioning that you had moved them off the con. Where there any other times that you had to move them? How dynamic was their positions during the -- you know, the TMA, before periscope depth?

LT. COEN: Most of the evolutions, the distinguished visitors stood on the port side of the control room, behind the dive, back to the Number 2 plotter. Some were on the con, some were in front of the con, next to the helmsman, and they wrapped around the front of the CON towards the CDP and then along that kind of wall. They were pretty much everywhere in the control room, except, you know, probably the further aft portion were -- were maybe less --

MR. CRIDER: You mean behind the --

LT. COEN: Yeah. Behind the plotters, they were probably not back there. They were probably closer to where the action was, you know, at the ship's control party to really kind of watch them drive the ship, so they'd be in front of the con, on the con, looking over there on the port side, and some were even

on the starboard side of fire control.

MR. CRIDER: Now, when you asked them to get off the CON so you could, you know, in preparation for, you know, PD, where did most of them come?

LT. COEN: They went to the port side by the Number 2 plotter.

MR. CRIDER: Okay. And the CO, he was behind -- well, he was on the con. Did he stay there -- I mean, all the time on the platform for the whole --

LT. COEN: For most of the time, he was behind the -- on the con, next to the Number 2 scope, behind the dive, behind me. He did walk into the state room once. He walked around to the front of the CON in sonar and over to the fire control screen. So, I mean, he did move, but if he -- the time he was stationary, he was basically behind me directing the angles and dangles.

The time he wasn't directly involved in all that, he was in the state room or in the sonar or in fire control, getting his feel for the contact situation.

MR. CRIDER: Do we have timing on those? Are there -- do we have that already or do we need the timing of when he went to the state room?

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Yeah. I think we do have that, yes.

LT. COEN: The time he went would have been briefly. Only maybe for a minute, to step in and step out.

MR. CRIDER: All right. Now, you mentioned again that there was a method which wasn't used for searching the bearing. What was the -- what was the method that basically that you were talking -- that you were looking for that you didn't see?

LT. COEN: After the three rapid sweeps and the no-close contacts call, it would be followed by a 360-degree sweep in low power for 45 seconds approximately. Then you would alternate a 90-degree search and high power for 45 seconds, followed by a 360 sweep and low power. That would -- over about four or five minutes, you would cover all four sectors in high power, still maintain the low-power search in between for -- to prevent contacting your baffles coming up on you very fast that you don't see.

So, it allows you -- the high-power and low-power search, you know, at balanced intervals. I did not see that one when Commander Waddle did his periscope search. He kind of -- I think there's a rapid

sweep and then he had a selected bearing and alternated the powers on selected bearings.

To correlate existing sonar contacts with visual contacts, what is typical is for the officer of the deck or the scope operator, which typically is the officer of the deck, to ask -- say place me on the bearing to CR-12 or fire control operator would say CR-12 bears this, come left or right 20 degrees, come left five degrees, okay, mark it on the bearing for CR-12, and then the scope operator would then take a low-power look to see if he sees anything and then increase the power and pan left or right, and if he has a contact, he'd state, you know, I have a visual contact on this bearing, you know, and then do an observation under the same CR number so it correlates or if it's a new person, new contact, does a new visual number. If he does not hold the visual contact, he would say do not hold visual contact on this bearing, and then you'd proceed to the next contact number and bearing.

That was not done at periscope depth. Commander Waddle did not look down bearings or asked to be placed on specific bearings to existing sonar contacts. I'm not sure the standard way that that happened, the -- whether it's the FCW, he needs to do

it, or the scope operator needs to do it. It's kind of just understood that there's three contacts out there, we need to look at them, and it can be up to the scope operator to say okay, put me on these bearings or a qualified senior FCW would understand that needs to be done, and he would prompt that.

MR. CRIDER: The bearings then would come from the -- from the fire control bearings, not the sonar bearings?

LT. COEN: It would come from the fire control system which is from sonar basically. Sonar sends the data to fire control, and then it's kind of filtered from there into uniform dots, basically, that are time averaged, and then to the fire control technician.

The fire control technician has a given bearing, and it may be a little bit off from what sonar's saying at the bearing instant, but for the most part, they should be pretty close, and then on the wall is a bearing repeater that if you drop the scope, the bearing the scope is on will control display, and the scope operator -- the FCW can say okay, the contact bears 3-4-0, you're on north, come left 20 degrees, come left five degrees, okay, you're on 3-4-0.

MR. CRIDER: And again, the captain didn't do that?

LT. COEN: The captain did not prompt the FTOW to place him on the selected bearings, no.

MR. CRIDER: And the CO had previously exhibited anything close to a -- when you say -- well, let's go back. You stated that this was a short PD. Had the CO done any -- had a short PD to this previously?

LT. COEN: Under what circumstances? Under --

MR. CRIDER: Well, under non-time situation.

LT. COEN: We have -- you have to understand, going to periscope depth is not a routine evolution. So, there's a purpose behind it, and usually you perform certain evolutions, get messages or conduct, you know, evolutions. It's not something that is typically of short duration.

So, to go up and do what you're -- what you want to do, it's going to take more than two minutes. If your purpose is to go up and make sure the area is clear as far as doing the emergency blow, you look for as long as you feel you look to make sure it's safe, and, you know, the commanding officer's judgment was that was long enough.

There were other evolutions to be done, and I can't remember another time that I was off of that for emergency blow or the -- how much time we spent for prior emergency blows when I wasn't officer of the deck to ensure the area was clear.

So, no, I don't remember a time we were up for periscope depth for a short period of time just because we were doing something that took longer than two minutes.

MR. CRIDER: Okay. Going into the rescue phase, you mentioned -- let's see. I was just wondering in that period, what -- where was -- where was the CO, you know, when the XO took over command of the rescue?

LT. COEN: The CO was in control. He was under stress after the collision. After the XO described what was happening and what -- you know, kind of in a calming voice, okay, we just had a collision, now we need to carry out some actions and go into the recovery stage, you know, this is not -- this is the time to be calm and deliberate and safe and take actions, not time to -- to panic and lose control of ourselves.

The CO after that put on a harness and went to the bridge and then took a look from there, and I

think afterwards, after his time on the bridge was done, he was in radio with the chief of staff and the radio supervisor, Senior Chief Smith, communicating to SUBPAC and reporting the collision and discussing events and how they were going to respond from there.

MR. CRIDER: Okay. I think we've kind of been working ourselves through the position, you know, the position of everybody throughout the time, and that's one of the things that will establish the -- now, we're jumping a little ahead of the question, which is where I had that.

With the XO, you mentioned that it -- you know, he was at the time of the -- oh, five-minute periscope to periscope depth, that he went to sonar. Where was he before that?

LT. COEN: I'm not sure where he was during angles and dangles. He may have stepped in. He may have looked at the chart to see where he was. I'm not really sure where he was prior to angles and dangles. I believe he talked with the navigator on the ship's position earlier, around 1300, to say -- after the navigator said okay, you know, what are we going to do? Are we going to be on time or are we going to skip or do the evolutions and be late, I believe he talked to

-- to the captain about this, but the only time that I remember seeing him is when he told me -- after the commanding officer told me we had five minutes to be at periscope depth, he told me I could use sonar to assist me. Besides that, I'm not really sure where he was for that afternoon.

MR. CRIDER: All right. Well, after, did you observe him in the -- in the doorway at sonar?

LT. COEN: Yes.

MR. CRIDER: After the -- well, at the time. Where did he go to roughly?

LT. COEN: After he told me -- after he told me he was going to go to sonar to assist me, he went to sonar to assist me. If he was inside the whole time or if he was at the doorway for part of the time, I can't tell you the exact nature of where he was. Yes, he was in the doorway. Yes, I saw him go in sonar. I don't know when he was looking at the sonar screens and when he was at the doorway.

I mean, when he was in the doorway, he could look at the ASVDU or the sonar screen or fire control.

MR. CRIDER: Okay. You mentioned, you know, that in the loop back to -- to the -- to the Ehime Maru, you were at the console that long for reporting

purposes. Do you remember which way the boat was pointed at that time? How far along on the turn you were?

LT. COEN: I do not do the plot long. Someone else. No, I don't know where the ship was in its turn. I don't know. I don't see how that's really important.

MR. CRIDER: How that's relevant?

LT. COEN: If it --

MR. CRIDER: It was just trying to get the more precise reconstruction.

LT. COEN: Okay. No. The -- the plot we read off was for general reporting requirements. It wasn't for, you know, for exact reconstruction, and even what they reported over the radio would not have been the most specific GPS lat/long. It would have been, you know, something less specific than that.

MR. CRIDER: Okay. I think that concludes my questions on your -- on your narrative you had this morning. I'll pass it on to Mr. Strauch.

MR. STRAUCH: Okay. Are you all set or do you want to take a break?

LT. COEN: Yeah. Can we do a break right now?

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Sure. All right. The time is now about 1345. We'll take a 10-minute break.

(Whereupon, a recess was taken.)

MR. STRAUCH: Okay. I'm Barry Strauch. Lt. Coen, I'm going to try to stay within one topic before we go on to the next, but I will ask your patience if I don't do that because I suspect I'll be jumping around.

I'd like to start with your background. Could you just tell us about where you went to college and -- and what your experience was from the time you graduated?

LT. COEN: I went to Florida State University, and I studied chemical engineering. I graduated in the Spring of 1997. I was in a program called NUPOC, "Nuclear Prospective Officer Candidate", similar to ROTC program, but a little different in the fact that I was already committed to the Navy in that I had enlisted a part of this program, and basically based on the program, committed myself to a career with the Navy in the nuclear field, whether that was on a submarine or aircraft carrier.

After I graduated, I went to Officer's Candidate School in Pensacola, received my commission, went to six months of nuclear power training in Orlando, Florida, followed by six months of nuclear prototype training, the difference there from the

prototype kind of classroom, book knowledge, and one's kind of hands-on operation knowledge, followed --

Following nuclear prototype, I went to three months of summer basic -- summer school for basic officers. It's a three-month class. The advanced courses for department heads to come back, and it's a six-month course. There, I learned about submarines and their systems and weapons, some ship driving.

Following that school, I reported to Greeneville in March of '99 and proceeded with my qualification program on board, first qualifying engineer officer of the watch. I did that about, I think, five months. From there, I also at the same time qualifying contact coordinator and then qualifying diving officer of the watch, surface officer of the deck, qualifying in port watch stations, like engineering duty officer and shift duty officer, and then I think around June of 2000 qualified submerged officer of the deck, and then in July, I received my summary dolphins.

MR. STRAUCH: How many different COs have you worked for?

LT. COEN: Prior to the collision, one CO. That was Commander Waddle. I reported on board

approximately two weeks after he assumed the command, after he took command.

MR. STRAUCH: Okay. And since the collision?

LT. COEN: Since the collision, Captain Cortese from Squadron One was the commanding officer. He was the interim commanding officer after the collision, until he was relieved by Commander Bogdin. Commander Bogdin was recently, after his involvement with the grounding, and then Commander Bogdin was relieved by Captain Guy, who was the previous commander of the Greeneville, the person relieved by Commander Waddle, and so I have never formally met Captain Guy, but he's the current commanding officer, and there's a new commander reporting on board to take command after Captain Guy's interim role the role.

MR. STRAUCH: Okay. Have you served as OOD under Captains Cortese or Bogdin?

LT. COEN: Yes, I have. I -- well, I'm not sure about Captain Cortese. I'm not sure if I ever went to sea with Captain Cortese. Actually, no. I don't think I ever went to sea with Captain Cortese in the role where he was commanding officer.

MR. STRAUCH: Okay.

LT. COEN: I've been to sea with Captain

Cortese when he was a rider and a monitor for the ship. I believe when I reported back to the submarine to go to sea was the day of the change of command when Commander Bogdin took over.

MR. STRAUCH: Okay.

LT. COEN: But I have served as officer of the deck under Commander Bogdin.

MR. STRAUCH: About how many times have you served as OOD under Captain Bogdin?

LT. COEN: Maybe 10 or 20 times. I don't know. I think he's probably -- an approximate three-week period where the ship was at sea for its operational safeguards exam, work-up and exam, and pre-overseas movement and certification. Three -- three, maybe four weeks of at-sea time, and part of that time, I spent requalifying officer of the deck to become proficient and for the watch after that.

MR. STRAUCH: And you estimated that you had served a total of 20 to 40 times. Is that over and above the 10 to 20 times that you estimated you served under Captain Bogdin or --

LT. COEN: Yes, that's a -- that's above that.

MR. STRAUCH: Okay. On any of these occasions

when you were OOD with Captain Bogdin, were there distinguished visitors on board?

LT. COEN: No, there was not.

MR. STRAUCH: Okay. Of the 10 -- of the 20 to 40 times or I guess it's 20 to 60 times you served as OOD, about how many of those -- how many of those were distinguished visitor trips?

LT. COEN: Maybe a handful. There was dependent cruises. The ship did here where the ship took family members on a cruise to Lahani, Maui, and anchored out there for a week. I'm not -- not sure of the exact date of that, but I was qualified surface officer of the deck. I do remember driving the ship. I'm not sure if I was qualified submerged.

MR. STRAUCH: Well, other than the fact that the control room was crowded by the --

LT. COEN: Let me finish. Also, there was a period of time on an Eastern Pacific Deployment where there were DV cruises where we took guests from Senior EOs and took them to Santa Barbara. Also, we did many midshipman cruises in that time period where basically we treat the midshipmen from the Naval Academy or other universities as distinguished visitors, show them the same things, and I think there were other times here in

Pearl Harbor where the ship served in a distinguished visitor capacity.

It was my experience that, you know, Greeneville did a lot of these, maybe more than the average boat. We were sensitive about being the tour ship and taking people out.

MR. STRAUCH: Why do you think that was?

LT. COEN: I think a lot of that was the commanding officer's personality. He was very proud of his ship and never hesitated to show it off to somebody, whether it was somebody with longstanding ties to the Navy or someone, you know, he met out at dinner the previous night and wanted to show the submarine to.

MR. STRAUCH: The Court of Inquiry kind of came down on him for the way he ran the ship with the distinguished visitors on the cruise. I think -- yeah. Their Finding Number 38, "The CO was inappropriately disposed to entertain his civilian guests rather than safely demonstrate Greeneville's operational capabilities."

LT. COEN: That's --

MR. STRAUCH: Court of Inquiry, Finding Number 38.

LT. COEN: Oh, Court of Inquiry.
MR. STRAUCH: You agree with that?
LT. COEN: Could you say that again?
MR. STRAUCH: "The CO was inappropriately disposed to entertain his civilian guests rather than safely demonstrate Greeneville's operational capabilities."
LT. COEN: Yes, I'd agree to that. I think it's -- it's clear the ship was not operating in a safe manner as evident by the collision.
MR. STRAUCH: Okay. If there hadn't been a collision, did you see anything different about the way you were operating this ship as OOD versus the other ones when there were civilians on board?
LT. COEN: The ship went to periscope depth very rapidly. It's clear to me now, looking at the reconstruction, that it wasn't a safe approach to periscope depth. So, I mean, that wasn't safe. I can't recall previous times with guests on board that we made such a rapid ascent to periscope depth or times when we did emergency blows, and I'm not saying that those were unsafe or that they were not safe. I was more junior at the time and, you know, kind of almost in a role of a visitor myself, trying to figure out what the ship was

doing and observing.

The ship did operate at excessive speeds and depths, you know, that were beyond classification levels for anyone on the crew. So, that had been done previously. That wasn't something that was unique to the distinguished visitors cruise of that day where the ship operated at its max speed or test depth. That had been done, to the best of my recollection, on all our previous trips.

It wasn't something that slipped the commanding officer's mind. It was something that he was very proud of, that he could show guests what the ship's capabilities were, and it didn't escape him that what he was showing was confidential. He made it very clear that this is what the ship can do and, you know, what you witness here stays on board the submarine.

Is that inherently unsafe operation of the ship? The ship's designed to operate such that it can be operated at high speeds, but it was previous -- it was confidential material that was released to people not, you know, cleared for that type of information. It was done on more than one occasion.

MR. STRAUCH: Well, that raises a whole bunch of questions. How did you feel as the junior officer

watching your CO disclose information that he wasn't supposed to to people he wasn't supposed to and do it repeatedly?

LT. COEN: It -- it raised a lot of questions in my mind on what -- what confidential means and what the security practices were. I'm not sure what -- you know, how you would respond to that.

The whole ship knows there's guests on board and knows how fast the ship's going, know how deep the ship is and knows that those are in excess of, you know, unclassified levels. That responsibility to maintain that information secure, you know, falls on a lot of people's heads, and I'm not sure who gave that authority or whose decision it was to break that. I guess ultimately, it was the commanding officer's decision to give that up, and I'm not sure who, if anyone, ever confronted him on that.

MR. STRAUCH: Did you ever talk to anybody about that? Anybody on the ship?

LT. COEN: I don't know if I did or not.

MR. STRAUCH: Did it surprise you that the Court of Inquiry acted the way they did when they were frankly surprised and disappointed and angry that he had done it?

LT. COEN: To some extent, it did. The chief of staff, Captain Brandhuber, who was on board, and this was a surprise to anybody for, you know, he's the one man on board who's not in any relationship with the commanding officer. He's in a senior relationship to him, and he did not come into that. So, I'm not sure he felt that was acceptable behavior or what he thought about that.

What I did find interesting about the Court of Inquiry is some issues that were classified were very sensitive and very thou shalt not release classified information, how at the same time, some material that was discussed in the Court of Inquiry was classified material and made public, such as the periscope team, which I described earlier, was previously classified material but made public at the Court of Inquiry.

So, I do find it -- the Court of Inquiry's behavior peculiar, and in one voice, they chastised the commanding officer for breaking these rules, but in the same voice, have an expert, you know, read out of a book that has a confidential "C" next to it, you know, in an open forum.

MR. STRAUCH: What did that tell you about

how seriously they took his revealing the speed and depth of the submarine?

LT. COEN: It shows me that there's -- there's a difference in maybe standards or difference in relative importance on, you know, those values.

MR. STRAUCH: There's also an issue of oversight, the fact that they were surprised that he had done this, and if this was a really tight operation, they would have -- wouldn't they have known that, what he was doing and what he was revealing?

LT. COEN: Who would have known what?

MR. STRAUCH: The Navy superiors, wouldn't they have known how he was running the ship, that -- that if -- if they really had control over things, they would have known what was going on and would not have been surprised that he was revealing this information?

LT. COEN: Yes. I believe senior leadership in the Navy should have known what was going on on board the Greeneville, should have known that the ship was exceeding classified levels of speed and depth.

Captain Brandhuber was aware for that and did not intervene in that. Other leadership was on board the ship at other times to witness that. Some perhaps were retired admirals, some maybe active duty. I'm not

sure everybody who was witness to that, but I do feel that senior leadership in the Navy, and even on the submarine itself, the XO, should have known about some of these issues.

I also think there's evidence that senior leadership in the Navy, outside of the submarine, and even leadership on board the submarine, the XO and department heads, there was information there that they knew about that indicated that the ship was operated in less than -- less than safe manners for given times.

MR. STRAUCH: What kind of information was this, and how would they have known about it?

LT. COEN: The -- we left -- we pulled back into Pearl Harbor on February 2nd. Prior to that, we were in San Francisco. When the ship left San Francisco, there were two people on board who were riding the ship. One was the Squadron One Engineer, Lt. Commander Ben Pearson, and one was, I believe, the SUBPAC in 4, Captain Huller. Both of them worked for the Squadron or SUBPAC and report to the superiors of the submarine in the chain of command.

Prior to pulling into San Francisco, there was a brief discussing the entrances and exits of San Francisco. What was not really touched on were some of

the hazards there that are unique to San Francisco. On the exit out of San Francisco, there were disagreements between the planned chart navigation path out and the pilot or recommendations from the pilot on when to -- to sit the watch below deck and prepare to submerge the ship and how to do that.

There was also guidance in a Navy Instruction that described in detail the specific hazards that were present in San Francisco. What ended up happening was there was a delay in shifting the watch below deck. This was based on the commanding officer having discussion with, I believe, a radio station while he was on his cell phone and also coordinating a photo event with personnel on the Golden Gate Bridge while the ship was exiting.

This resulted in delay in shifting the watch below deck, at which time, a wave came over the ship, and several hundred gallons of water came down the hatch and flooded out part of the control room, causing large damage to the ship and some equipment failure.

No one was injured, but that was because they were in the process of shifting the watch below deck and were almost complete with that. That specific hazard was not adequately addressed in the detail that

-- of the Navy Instruction which described -- described that, and not all the precautions were taken to avoid that -- that water, which was one of the major concerns of going in and out of San Francisco.

There's been several instances of similar incidents and even people being washed off bridges because of large waves there. So, I feel that that -- that one event, before the collision, should have drawn attention to the navigation practices of the ship and maybe more of what was going on inside the ship, and it wasn't an isolated event that the ship kept to itself.

There was -- there was a rider from Squadron board and from SUBPAC who were aware of that and were made witnesses to it. So, that's one incident that I feel that could have raised or raised a flag in some people's minds. If not the man superior to the submarine, to at least the senior leadership on board the submarine, the XO and department heads, you know, why did this happen? What really happened? How can we prevent this? You know, why did this happen again?

Another incident that I think could have drawn attention to the ship and appropriate leadership to look at this problem was an event when the ship did an emergency blow to prevent going out of area. There -

- this was an event where the ship submerged water that changed at midnight. When the water changes like that, it's designed to keep the ship, you know, in assigned water at all times.

However, it takes planning on the part of the ship to be in the right place at the right time. On this given event, the ship was too far away from the edge of the box to get to the water at midnight, and basically they would be out of area or they would need to surface to basically avoid the whole discussion of what water they owned and where they belonged.

I was not the officer of the deck for this, but I've heard this story many times, and I was on board the submarine when it happened. To the best of my knowledge, what happened was the ship increased speed to try and get to the new water as soon as possible, increasing the speed all the way up to the maximum bell that the ship could operate at, very untypical for routine transit.

Basically, the decision was made that the ship was not going to be able to make it there on time, and that the ship, in order to prevent going out of area, decided to surface the ship, and to my knowledge, they surfaced the ship by performing emergency below

without the prerequisite trip to periscope depth to ensure that the contact picture was clear or -- and that emergency blow could have been safely performed.

There was no collision on this day, but I don't believe that's the result of a safe ascent to periscope depth and a safe look at the contact situation.

MR. STRAUCH: Was Commander Waddle the CO on both occasions?

LT. COEN: Yes, he was.

MR. STRAUCH: The sense that I got from reading the Court of Inquiry and reading other -- other information was that he was very well regarded until this incident, and yet that does conflict with what I'm hearing you say.

LT. COEN: I was one of the senior officers. I can't tell you how well he was regarded by his peers or by the superiors. To the best of my knowledge, the ship had a good reputation. These events, I find it hard to believe that they were unnoticed by Squadron or SUBPAC.

The event that I just described to you where an emergency blow was done, you know, without the trip to periscope depth, on that occasion, there was a

captain from Squadron on board, I believe it was Captain Cortese, I believe he was riding the ship at that time.

MR. STRAUCH: One could draw several implications from the fact that apparently Squadron leadership did not act on these incidents. One is that for some reason, they didn't know about it, but that would not be supported by the fact that there were senior officers on board at the time.

The other or one other is that maybe these kinds of things happened to other vessels, and it doesn't stand out one way or the other. Is there any one theory that you have about this, why nothing was done?

LT. COEN: No, I really don't. I don't have anything to make me believe that my submarine is much different than any other submarine. My CO went to the same training that all COs go through, you know. My XO went to the same training that all XOs went through. My department heads, I think, on the average are representative of the fleet, and I don't believe that there are special circumstances on the Greeneville that make it the worst boat out there or in any way unrepresentative of any other boat out there.

MR. STRAUCH: What about the kind of oversight it got? Was that in keeping with your understanding of how it should be done?

LT. COEN: What kind of oversight are you talking about?

MR. STRAUCH: I guess from the Squadron.

LT. COEN: I don't believe that our ship was monitored any more or any less than any other ship out there.

MR. STRAUCH: Do you think the oversight --

CAPTAIN KYLE: This is Captain Kyle. Lt. Coen, I don't think is in a position to answer that question.

MR. STRAUCH: Okay.

CAPTAIN KYLE: I mean, he can offer his opinion, but I don't think he has an oversight role.

MR. STRAUCH: Would he be in a position to observe the oversight and -- and comment on it?

CAPTAIN KYLE: Sure. Whether there's more on Greeneville than other boats, as long as that's the discussion.

MR. STRAUCH: All right. What is your opinion about the level of oversight the Greeneville had? Was it -- was it sufficient to provide the people who

should have known information as to how the Greeneville was being operated?

LT. COEN: To my knowledge, there were enough people on board when bad things happened to the ship or could have happened to the ship that could have warranted more oversight or more investigation into the daily actions of the ship that were not followed through.

An example, the incident in San Francisco taking water down the hatch, you know, with the CO on board, went pretty much uncritiqued and undiscussed. There wasn't remedial training that said, you know, we really screwed up back there, and here's how we're going to prevent this from happening again, which is fairly typical of the Navy for most situations.

The Navy is really ready to find root causes and assign corrective actions to prevent them from happening again. It's very common in the engine room to, you know, get down to the source of the problem rapidly and pass up lessons learned and to make sure it doesn't happen again.

With this situation in San Francisco, it wasn't done and passed out to the -- to the ward room, the officer of the deck. The emergency blow was done to

prevent going out of area, to my knowledge, wasn't critiqued and training wasn't held to prevent the ship from going out of area in the future or close to going out of area, and I'm not sure how far out the chain of command that information went.

MR. STRAUCH: What about with the collision? Have they -- what is your opinion about the follow-up self-analysis/self-critique the Navy has been doing since the collision?

LT. COEN: The -- the collision was followed by a recertification for the ship. After that recertification, the ship went through safeguards examination, another certification, and then went through an officer certification.

I think those reviews were for some part ineffective, especially the review concerning navigation as the ship recently had a grounding. Part of that problem was a wrong chart on board, and many charts were missing. If a more effective review was carried out, some of the certification process, perhaps that problem could have been caught and fixed.

The problem wasn't just a wrong chart. The -- as part of the corrective action from that collision or that grounding was the removal of the CO, XO and the

navigator and the assistant navigator were -- their review of the chart was ineffective. So, I'm not sure why that happened. Was that a training fault on their behalf? Were they not trained properly enough to review that or was it a breakdown in standards?

Overall, I don't think there were corrective actions after the collision were sufficient to fix all the problems that were on board the ship.

MR. STRAUCH: Well, what I'm hearing from you is that the one common -- common follow-up between the collision and grounding was that the senior officers were removed. Is that fair?

LT. COEN: State your question again.

MR. STRAUCH: Well, it sounds from what you're saying that the one follow-up that was in common following the collision and the grounding was that the senior officers were removed.

LT. COEN: You're saying that's uncommon or common in both?

MR. STRAUCH: I think it's common in both, from what I hear you saying. Is that a fair -- a fair statement of what you -- of what you're saying?

LT. COEN: I'm sorry. I'm really not understanding your question.

MR. STRAUCH: Okay. Let me -- let me rephrase it.

LT. COEN: Rephrase it again.

MR. STRAUCH: Let me rephrase it. I'm hearing from you that -- that you feel that some of the follow-up actions after the collision were -- weren't thorough, and perhaps had it been more thorough, the proper charts would have been on board, and the grounding wouldn't have happened.

But one action that was done following both the collision and the grounding was that the senior officers were removed in both rather than taking a more substantive review of -- of procedures and oversight and so on, and I guess I'm asking you is that -- did I characterize what you're saying correctly or am I reading too much into what you're saying?

LT. COEN: I will agree with you that both commanding officers were relieved after the collision and the grounding. I think it's fairly obvious.

One thing in my observation, going back to the ship, after the collision, I felt there was an air about the ship that the ship was a good ship, and the problems that the ship had in February were the result of one man and that however unfortunate that day was,

it was one man's fault, and that one man's gone, so the ship was fixed, rather than, I think, being more introspective and looking at it, what part every individual on board the ship had played.

Being officer of the deck played a role in the collision as well as the executive officer as well as myself, the officer of the deck, as well as the people in sonar as well as the people in fire control as well as anybody who had experience taking the ship submarine -- taking the ship to periscope depth, whether that was fellow officers in the ward room on board or the chief of staff on board.

I think there was a real reluctance to address those issues, that this was more than the fault of one man.

MR. STRAUCH: This reluctance was within the ship or beyond the ship?

LT. COEN: I don't think I can really comment on outside of the ship. My perspective is really from on board the submarine and my interactions with other people on board the submarine.

MR. STRAUCH: Well, if you were faced with the same situation that you faced on February 9th, what would you -- what would you do differently in yourself,

and I'm sure you've asked yourself this question?

LT. COEN: Yes. There's a lot I'd do different. I would have been more deliberate in my actions to make sure the ship operated safely and got to periscope depth safely and did the emergency blow safely.

I would have been more independent in my actions in that they would be my own actions and not the repetitions of what the commanding officer directed verbatim. I would separate myself from him in my orders so that we were not effectively the same person or the same unit.

I would have spent more time doing target motion analysis. I would have spent more time understanding the contact picture prior to going to periscope depth, prior to doing angles and dangles. I would have spent more time looking for contacts with both periscopes, with possibly the radar. I would have spent time higher. I would have broached the ship.

I would have made sure that everybody understood their job and was -- was free to speak and communicate their issues, whether that was, you know, to kind of minimize the -- the role the visitors had and make sure that things were more -- more deliberate,

and I would have had the periscope depth brief, explained what we were doing, the purpose for going periscope depth.

I would have made sure that there was an environment present where anybody could have voiced their concerns and that would have been listened to in a reasonable manner.

MR. STRAUCH: Why didn't you have a periscope brief?

LT. COEN: I answered that earlier. Just based on the time constraints and the challenge to go periscope depth rapidly.

MR. STRAUCH: Did you know at the time that you were violating the standing order in not having it?

LT. COEN: I know it's standard practice to perform a periscope depth brief. I'm not sure I would call it a violation of standing orders to not perform one. Now, I would never think of not doing a periscope depth brief, but at the time, I'm not sure that that was a violation of the standing order, and I also had the commanding officer present, the executive officer present, other department heads present as well as the chief of staff and SUBPAC.

So, if there was something that someone felt

that I was doing incorrectly, I felt that, you know, there were plenty of eyes to make sure that I was doing things -- to keep an eye on me.

MR. STRAUCH: What if the same situation were to occur again with the XO present and -- and particularly with the CO trying to push things along, how likely is it that were the situation to occur again, you could be more deliberate, and you could take the time to do the things you said you would do if this were to occur again?

LT. COEN: Your question is, if we were in the same situation with the same people on board?

MR. STRAUCH: And particularly with the CO pushing things along, how easy is it for someone in your position --

(Pause)

MR. STRAUCH: And particularly with the CO pushing things along, how easy is it for someone in your position to take the time that you said you would take next time, to do things more carefully, more orderly to give the briefing and so on?

LIEUTENANT COHEN: I think it is a difficult situation for anybody to confront their superior

officer in the presence of other officers who may be superior to them and definitely superior to you and as well as distinguished visitors present. It is difficult for any officer no matter what their rank. However, that does not mean that I would be extremely vigilant in making my point known. And I am, you know, clearly aware of the consequences of not making, of what can happen. So, I would definitely make my point known and be heard. The consequences of confronting your CO and maybe challenging his authority in the presence of others maybe creating a new, maybe disrespectful, maybe difficult, but the consequences of not doing that, I think, in this case, were more devastating than bad evaluation marks or, you know, damage to someone's career.

MR. STRAUCH: Did the Navy offer you in guidance in dealing with this kind of situation? I mean, it sounds like an enormously difficult situation for any junior officer to face, what is best versus what your CO wants you to do?

LIEUTENANT COHEN: The Navy trains people to understand their actions and understand the requirements and follow them. It talks about forceful

backup and teaching that, but, I think in practice it is very hard to teach and very difficult to learn. It is not a strong point to teach, to question the experience and training and judgement of your superior officers. It is, especially for the military, it is a strong point to trust and accept that. That the person leading you in battle is confident and is the most experienced person on that submarine, not someone that you need to question. The Navy doesn't teach you compliance and blind following of leadership, but, at the same time it is very difficult to teach someone how you can confront a superior officer in front of other individuals.

MR. STRAUCH: Is it fair to say you also ask yourself what other people on the Greeneville could have done differently on February 9?

LIEUTENANT COHEN: Yes, I have thought about that.

MR. STRAUCH: What could the Executive Officer have done differently?

MR. STRAUCH: On 9 February he could have made clear to the ship what was going to happen as far as the ship's time line and once it was clear that the

plan of the day could not be followed to all extents as published, come up with a plan of how we would change that and pass that out and to make no secret about it. It was never clear to me how we were going to handle being late to Papa Hotel or if we were going to carry out all the evolutions of angles and dangles and emergency blow. The Executive Officer, better than any other officer aboard a submarine is in a position to balance the Commanding Officer and keep him honest to check him at times when he needs to be checked. The submarine is a team. We all have responsibilities, and make sure the team works properly, but it is much more easier for the Executive Officer to take the Commanding Officer behind closed doors and have a discussion than it is for a Junior Officer to do that or a department head. The Executive Officer was in the sonar and he had a better picture of sonar information than I did. I did not have -- so, he was witness to information that I was not, and with all his experience onboard submarines and all his training, he knows what it takes to get to periscope depth safely. He knows what is enough information and what is not enough information. And if he doesn’t have that information, then I think you have

to question his position as an executive officer. He looked at that sonar information and he either saw enough there, which in reconstruction we could say there wasn't enough there, or he saw that there wasn't enough there and did nothing with that information. So, I think he could have done something there. He could have requested more TMA, or requested or said, we need to do something else here.

He is also in a difficult situation of confronting his superior officer. But, as the XO I think he is in a better position than anybody else onboard that submarine to do that.

MR. STRAUCH: I think the Court of Inquiry and I may have the words wrong, but I think they characterized Commander Waddle as being kind of overbearing and exercising his authority a lot or directly rather than rather than guiding people to allow them to do things on their own while monitoring them. And I wonder is it fair to expect an XO to be able to do that with a CO who appears to have been as powerful, whatever the proper word I am trying to get at is? Do you see what I am saying?

LIEUTENANT COHEN: No, I don't.

MR. STRAUCH: Okay. Given Commander Waddle's personality, and his, his, his command style, is it fair to expect an XO to take that kind of role that you, that you believe he shouldn't have taken on February 9, or was Commander Waddle's personality such that one could have done that?

LIEUTENANT COHEN: I don't think any CO's personality absolves an XO of his responsibility to keep a CO in check. You know, some leaders have styles maybe more difficult than others, but, who else is going to do it?

MR. STRAUCH: Okay. Was there anything different about this DV cruise was conducted compared to others that you have seen, other than let's say family cruises or midshipmen cruises?

LIEUTENANT COHEN: Not really. I mean, DV cruises tend to run over the planned time. They tend to be late.

MR. STRAUCH: Commander Waddle;'s attorney alleged that, that the Secretary of Navy may have had a role in arranging this cruise. And certainly we know that the retired -- did have a role in this. Do you think that Commander Waddle acted differently on this

DV cruise than he did others that you had seen?

LIEUTENANT COHEN: No, I don't think the nature of who set the tour up or who was onboard affected the way Commander Waddle showed his submarine off. He was very part of the submarine and was happy to show anybody what it could do, whether that was on a DV cruise or a tour. He was happy to show his submarine.

MR. STRAUCH: You know from what one reads of the Court of Inquiry and from what you said about his delaying the departure out of San Francisco because of the opportunity to have photographs taken under the Golden Gate Bridge, could be one to describe him as someone who, not just liked to show off the ship, but really likes the limelight and likes, kind of hot dog, is that a fair assessment?

LIEUTENANT COHEN: It is hard for me to compare Commander Waddle to anybody else. He was my only commanding officer from the time I checked onboard to the time he was relieved after the collision. From my point of view as a junior officer onboard trying to qualify and learn, I had no reason to believe this submarine was any different than any other submarine and that this was how life onboard submarines was

normally carried out. People who would be better able to answer that question, would be people with more experience with other commanding officers on other submarines and I think that falls on the heads of the department heads and the executive officer. People with more experience, who know how a safe submarine operates and could take the events of San Francisco and the other emergency blow and put that in their head and say, you know, this is not normal. This is not right. And either report that to the appropriate level, the chain of command or at least in their own minds, say, I need to do more as a department head, I need to do more as an executive officer to ensure the safe navigation and operation of this ship.

MR. STRAUCH: Okay. One of the things that is kind of interesting is that the TMA was done the way it was done and I know that, he did tell you to take it up to periscope depth in five minutes. You said that the TMA leg should be done, I believe two to three minutes. Admiral Griffis said in the Court of Inquiry that an ideal TMA leg should be three to five minutes. Is there anything written on exactly how long a TMA leg should be?

LIEUTENANT COHEN: The ship's commanding officer standing order says anywhere from two to three minutes.

MR. STRAUCH: Okay. Was this the only time you had the TMA were conducted less than the standing order required or was this done before?

LIEUTENANT COHEN: This is the only time that I can remember that I did less than two, three minutes per leg. I don't know the exact times of previous legs, on previous TMA maneuvers, but it wasn't uncommon for the Commanding Officer to challenge officer of decks to go to periscope depth rapidly and make their preparations rapidly to, I guess, for their career development. And I can't tell you that all those follow the guidelines and were done by the book. I can't tell you that they were not, but, if you tell someone to do things rapidly there is a possibility they may go faster than what the guidance says you should do.

MR. STRAUCH: And that is okay?

LIEUTENANT COHEN: Are you asking me if that is okay to violate guidance?

MR. STRAUCH: Yes.

LIEUTENANT COHEN: No, it is not.

MR. STRAUCH: But, here it was okay?

LIEUTENANT COHEN: No, it was not okay in this case.

MR. STRAUCH: Okay. The other, there was also a disagreement on --

LIEUTENANT COHEN: Let me interrupt you here. The Commanding Officer writes the standing orders. If he feels that he needs to violate his standing orders, he is the person with the experience, training and judgement to make that decision. And there may be times when he does that based on, on his decisions. That is, it is not a decision that I would make as an officer of the deck, but that is something that the Commanding Officer has the authority to do, to violate his own standing orders.

MR. STRAUCH: And he doesn't have to give a reason for it, he doesn't have to articulate, he doesn't have to say, "I am violating the standing orders right now", he just says what he wants and that is really okay. Is that --

LIEUTENANT COHEN: He doesn't have to explain why he is carrying out certain actions. I would say that a good commanding officer would explain why he was

deviating from his own guidance, so it was clear in everyone's mind that this was for a reason and not, because I feel like it today, you know, that there is a basis behind this.

MR. STRAUCH: Well, on February 9, did you feel that his violating standing orders was, was okay, or was it arbitrary?

LIEUTENANT COHEN: Looking back there was not a good reason to rush anything that day. However, at the time, I did not feel that the ship was unsafe or in danger. I felt that the Commanding Officer and Executive Officer, with their experience, training and judgements, knew the status of the contact picture and that the ship would be operated in a safe manner.

MR. STRAUCH: That raises questions, of course, on the concept of standing orders. And, and this is probably not appropriate to pursue that here, but, I think it is an issue that needs pursuing.

There was disagreement on the role of the answer to, in the Court of Inquiry, one Admiral felt that there should have been very clear, very clear guidance as to what would be done because the answer was not working and another Admiral felt it wasn't that

big of a deal. How did you feel about it?

LIEUTENANT COHEN: I felt that it was a degradation in performance of the ship that would, would require extra effort, you know, to ensure safe navigation, which meant more time in sonar, more time in fire control to understand the contact picture. A temporary standing order was not written up. It, there could have been very easily, I guess a handwritten piece of guidance on what to do, typically typed and typically it takes so much time for someone to sit down and write that up. The ship is out for one day, nevertheless, there was time to prepare a document like that, that would provide guidance. However, it could have been, you know, handwritten or verbal direction, passed down watch to watch.

MR. STRAUCH: Guidance to spend more time in sonar and why do you think it wasn't done?

LIEUTENANT COHEN: I think it wasn't done because the ship was out for one day. It takes time for someone to type that up. The person who owned it was on watch in the engine room, after he was relieved, he could have typed it up or he could have had someone else type it up, but it kind of slipped through the

cracks as not the hot item for anyone to take care of immediately. After the maneuver watch, people were task rigging for the dive and then taking their watches.

MR. STRAUCH: At the time of the collision, were people as sensitive to the fact that the Astodo(ph) was not operating as they were at the beginning of the cruise and they recognized that it was not working? So, how did this effect that?

LIEUTENANT COHEN: After the collision?

MR. STRAUCH: At the time of the collision.

LIEUTENANT COHEN: I can't really comment, when the morning started, I wasn't on watch in the control room. I don't know how people reacted to the Astodo being out of commission. It certainly did not go to periscope depth without it earlier. I mean, it is a piece of equipment that is, probably the most important time you need to look at it is prior going to periscope depth. And we didn't have it when we went to periscope depth and your dependence on it would probably fall off as your need for accurate contact information falls off.

MR. STRAUCH: And yet at this time, the time of the collision, there was even less attention to

detail taken regarding surface contacts with the Astodo, if anything it sounds like it should have been just the opposite, because the Astodo was out, people should have taken more precaution and slowed things up and yet that is just the opposite of what was occurring.

LIEUTENANT COHEN: Yes, I agree with you. With the Astodo out of commission, more time should have been spent making sure that the ship operated adequately to compensate for that equipment being out of commission.

MR. STRAUCH: And on top of everything else, there were a lot of extra people in the control room who were standing between you, F2W Christian, and others and the equipment that they needed. Had that happened before?

LIEUTENANT COHEN: Yes, with every DV cruise it is very crowded in the control.

MR. STRAUCH: Was it as crowded this time as it was before?

LIEUTENANT COHEN: I can’t say if it was more or less crowded. I mean, it approximately was the same. Once it gets crowded in there, it is very crowded. You

can put more people in there, and I am not sure where they go, but, it is, once it is pretty tight, it is pretty tight.

MR. STRAUCH: Mr. Seacrest, what is his title?

LIEUTENANT COHEN: He was a fire control technical, 1st class.

MR. STRAUCH: Okay. So, Petty Officer Seacrest said that it was because of the visitors standing between him and the, what is it called?

MR. STRAUCH: CEP.

MR. STRAUCH: CEP, that prevented him from maintaining that. Do you think that is a fair, reasonable explanation or is there, you know, as to why he didn't do it, he did maintain the CEP?

LIEUTENANT COHEN: Could you say your question again?

MR. STRAUCH: Okay. His explanation as to why he didn't maintain the CEP was because of the number the civilians who were in his way. Do you think he is justified in, or is there something he could have done?

LIEUTENANT COHEN: No, I don't believe he is justified in not, not obtaining the CEP. I believe the reason he did do it was because of why he said he

didn't do it, because of the people in his way. But, I don't believe that releases him from his responsibilities as a watch stander.

MR. STRAUCH: One thing I don't understand is that, if he had been through this before, as apparently he had and there were civilians standing between him and the CEP before, why was it a problem now and not before?

LIEUTENANT COHEN: You may have to ask Seacrest that, I don't know.

MR. STRAUCH: Okay. What should he have done?

LIEUTENANT COHEN: He should have carried out his responsibilities. He should have, if people were in this way, he should have asked them to step out of the way.

MR. STRAUCH: Was it anybody else's responsibility to recognize that he wasn't maintaining the CEP?

LIEUTENANT COHEN: Yes. It was my responsibility as officer of the deck to ensure that that was operated. People who also could have noticed this would be Executive Officer, Commanding Officer, who walked directly beside it when they went to sonar.

MR. STRAUCH: You know, from I sit, I don't know much about submarines. I certainly, it is my first experience with it, but, here is the situation where you have a lot of extra people who are standing in a pretty important area, where one major piece of equipment is not maintained and one display that is suppose to be maintained, isn't being maintained and on top of that, things are being rushed and corners are being cut. It sounds like to me like a pretty sloppy operation all around. Is that a fair assumption, do you think?

LIEUTENANT COHEN: Yes, I do. The ship didn't operate up to the standards that it normally operates at, or the standards that it had been trained to. And in short, you know, less than standard, less than perfect conditions, sloppy.

MR. STRAUCH: You said that FT3 Brown was working near Petty Officer Seacrest, is that correct, at the time of the collision?

LIEUTENANT COHEN: Yes, that is correct.

MR. STRAUCH: Could you tell me what each one was doing, Seacrest and Brown?

LIEUTENANT COHEN: Seacrest was tracking

contacts. I am not sure what Brown was doing. He was sitting at the first console, closest to the CEP, I believe. I am not sure what he was doing.

MR. STRAUCH: Okay. Seacrest, Petty Officer Seacrest during the Court of Inquiry gave the impression of being very overworked at that time and very busy and he had numerous responsibilities. In your observations of him, was he overworked, was he very busy at that time?

LIEUTENANT COHEN: On watch, I don't think he was overworked, in the extent that he was given sufficient time to do his job. I can't comment about his other duties, outside of watch stander. For the number of contacts he had, he would not have been overworked for a 1st class petty officer to track. However, given the time constraints to go to periscope depth rapidly, he would have been hard pressed to evaluate the contacts and update the system solutions in that short period of time.

MR. STRAUCH: Okay.

LIEUTENANT COHEN: I mean, you talk about tracking three contacts, it is not a difficult job, but when you talk about tracking three contacts in three or

four minutes or less than that, it can be very difficult.

MR. STRAUCH: He got an accuracy resolution of the distance and bearing of Sierra 13 two minutes before the collision. Is that two minutes?

MR. STRAUCH: Just about the time, right before he went to periscope depth he was fairly, well, if what you are thinking of is speed, he was fairly close on the speed and about 20 degrees off on the course, which is not too bad.

MR. STRAUCH: And yet he didn't say anything.

MR. STRAUCH: He didn't know it was accurate.

MR. STRAUCH: But, it seems to me if he even had a suspicion that it might have been accurate, he should have said something. Did anybody talk to him about this afterwards, why didn't he say something about where Sierra 13 was?

LIEUTENANT COHEN: Are you talking about me or someone that day talking to him? Or are you talking about a counseling session afterwards?

MR. STRAUCH: Any of the above.

LIEUTENANT COHEN: I believe he was spoken to about that after the Court of Inquiry was over.

MR. STRAUCH: The explanation he gave the Court of Inquiry was that he heard Commander Waddle say that he was, I believe the words were "satisfied with the contact picture" or something to that effect and he felt that since Commander Waddle was, had so much experience, that he felt that the contact picture was, if he was comfortable with it, then that he was probably wrong. I have trouble with that. I mean, that doesn't sound like a real convincing argument to me. What do you think about what he said, his explanation?

LIEUTENANT COHEN: Okay. You asked me to comment on his explanation that because the CO said that he felt comfortable with the situation, that he must have been mistaken, Seacrest must have been mistaken. I think commanding officers have a lot of presence onboard submarines, the most experience person onboard of a submarine. And for the most part, their judgements are unquestioned. Their decisions are unquestioned. They are the authority at sea. If the CO says it is safe, who is going to question that is it not safe? If there is any doubt in Seacrest's mind about his solution, the CO says it is safe, than that answers it for Seacrest. I think that is a perception

you can take at the time. Seacrest is also a first class petty officer, it doesn't happen overnight. It doesn't happen with one CO. So, he has got much, much experience tracking contacts and it is hard to believe that maybe he would doubt himself so easily. The, I think in any event, the person who knows what is on the fractional screen the best, is the person operating it, and if there is doubt in his mind, especially now in hindsight, I think he needs to make that aware to everybody. And I wish that had happened and more people took a look at that to evaluate the, the contact there.

MR. STRAUCH: Did you talk to him afterwards about what happened in his performance?

LIEUTENANT COHEN: I talked to him afterwards to figure out kind of what happened and what contact we hit and how it happened. It wasn't any discussion on his conduct as a watch stander or his performance. It was more of a discussion of what does this data mean and what am I looking at here? You know, is this the contact we hit or is this contact we hit?

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LT. COEN: It's not a focused -- I think the focus got placed on the inside, you know, which definitely is very important, and the top side being proficient in weapons and events like that, but how much training time was allotted for safe navigation operation, doing emergency blows or routine navigation in a new port, and that the only training the ship does in that is done by outside agencies from the ship.

I think that's also a factor that was involved in this.

MR. STRAUCH: Okay. Just two more questions on our prepared list. I guess in retrospect, we probably should have moved them before our Number 8. That was really the summary.

Number 9. Sonar supervisor stated that the rapid turns turned the sonar screen to spaghetti. How long would it have taken for the sonar screen to steady out so that the bearing rate, if any, would have been more easily detectable?

LT. COEN: Which question was that again?

MR. STRAUCH: Number 9. It's on the last

page, the very last page.

LT. COEN: The guy that's in there needed two to three minutes. I think the time is at least three minutes, maybe longer would have been prudent in this case, and that's based on the prior angles and dangles.

It would be nice if there was a period of time which could basically draw a line in the time history from all the turns to the period where he may have done -- the time for the AV operator to say okay, I'll ignore everything below this line and this is what I'll focus on here.

By having it so close to the angles and dangles and especially not having the ship steady in depth or speed during that time makes it very difficult to separate the two events out.

So, my answer is at least three minutes, probably five minutes.

MR. STRAUCH: Okay. And the last of the prepared questions. Was there an announcement that angles and high-speed turn exercises had been completed? Would such an announcement or notification have had any beneficial effect on the performance of the sonar watchstander and the SEOW? For example, would it have caused the watchstanders to focus more on

the contact situation? Would this have helped them to recognize the right six-degree bearing rate?

LT. COEN: There was no announcement that said angles and dangles are complete. There was an announcement to make preparations for periscope depth. Yes, the announcement would have been beneficial, although I can't say how significant that would have been.

It's kind of shooting the operator in his head with the difference here, but what he's looking at is really going to be the basis of how he evaluates the data. If he knows that he needs to focus and mentally separate the data, that's one thing, but if the data's already separated for him, it would be much easier.

So, I think more time would have had a bigger impact, but I think making an announcement would have a big impact. I just don't know how significant it actually was.

MR. STRAUCH: Okay. Thank you very much, Lieutenant.

I think, considering the time, that it's appropriate to break at this point. It's now 11:52.

(Whereupon, a recess was taken.)

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. It's now about two

minutes after 1300. The date is still the 28th of September, and we're back from a lunch break. We're continuing our interview of Lt. Coen.

I'd like to continue on with the questioning. I believe, Barry, you were next.

MR. STRAUCH: I'd like to ask a few final questions.

Has your opinion of Commander Waddle changed as a result of the collision?

LT. COEN: Yes, it has. I -- he's the only commanding officer I had up to that point, and it was more in the nature, and I felt like I had a lot to learn from him.

Now, I question a lot of that and wonder -- question his experience and his judgment, and from the previous events that I've discussed kind of amplify those concerns, that maybe his judgment wasn't as sound as it should have been for a commanding officer of a submarine.

It also makes me question the judgment of similar people in his position and the system that puts him in place. We received a new commanding officer after the collision, and I didn't respect him as a highly-experienced commanding officer which -- with, I

guess, a great record and a proven history. It was more of the opposite, that I wanted to see him prove himself capable and kind of had a more questioning attitude to see how he would handle situations and where his experience prior to the ship would take him.

So, it kind of made me question the faith in the system that these people, based on their time in service or what they wear on their collar, automatically grant you a leap of faith that these people know what they're talking about and are really experienced.

So, I'd say it has shaken my kind of faith in the system, you know, from commanding officers down to the whole system that trains everybody, from executive officers and department heads, and that's kind of amplified after the grounding. A new commanding officer in place and removed for cause.

My experience with him also gave me reason to be concerned. For an example, what I want to talk about involved going to periscope depth under Commander Bogdin.

Going to periscope depth was not something that I would -- it's something very serious to me, especially after the collision, and something that I

took great concern about and wanted to make sure I was very safe and very clear and deliberate in my actions and that that was well understood by the control room parties, and because of that, maybe because it was the first several times after I had to requalify as officer of the deck, that it maybe took longer than some individuals would want.

That wasn't really my concern, how long it took, and I think my concern was -- and I think it's carried out through a lot of my experiences, I was more concerned in getting the job done right than getting the job done.

I'm not sure if that was always the focus. I talked about rigging for dives and how that drew a lot of attention because it wasn't done with that. The impression I got after being called attention to and asked what the status was, get the job done. The message wasn't get the job done right.

Here, going to periscope depth, especially, you know, several -- first several times after being a requalified officer of the deck, Commander Bogdin asked me -- told me he was ready for my report, the standard report to go to periscope depth, where I stated ship's condition and contact situation.

I told him I wasn't ready to give him that report yet and that I still wanted more time, and he kept on prompting me for that. I talked to him after that watch and discussed with him my concerns about prompting that report and that decision and that that may not -- for a less-qualified officer, a more junior officer, and maybe not one that's been through what I've been through, may be more likely to give that report before he's actually ready to give it, and I didn't want this commanding officer to make that mistake with less-qualified officers of the deck, people recently qualified to -- would want to please the commanding officer and make that report.

So, I made that point known to him. However, I still went to him on many other occasions to prompt officer of the deck full reports when he wanted a report prior to them initiating that report of their own free will, that they were ready to do that with officers junior to myself, which really concerned me, that especially the evolution of going to periscope depth, that a CO would want to step back and make sure that the officer of the deck was ready and didn't step forward and diminish the separation between the commanding officer, the superior, the supervisor, and

an officer of the deck who's making that report.

So, in all, I question the experience of a lot of my superior officers and that's something difficult to do in the military. There's not a lot of room for doubt, and there's definitely no room for disobeying a direct order. There's room for forcible back-up and room for -- there's room for leadership and -- and following superior's orders that's more than just -- it's definitely not, you know, blind obeyance of orders. There's room for thought there, but a lot of the organization depends on juniors having trust and faith in their superiors, and I think Greeneville is a good example where, at least for me, that foundation, you know, has kind of been shattered.

A commanding officer who rushed through TMA and rushed through a search for contacts that result in collisions, that executive officer who either didn't speak up when he knew the information wasn't there or thought there was sufficient information looking at sonar, the executive officer and other department heads aware of maybe less than safe conditions prior to that who didn't play a more active role because of those indications to kind of keep things more in check or more safe, and I think, also, the senior leadership

outside the submarine, who were made witness or made known to those events and didn't play a more active role in stopping that.

Also, I question the certification process and its effectiveness, especially in light of the grounding that happened after the ship went through rigorous certification. I think clearly, there could have been room for improvement in that interpretation and perhaps if the certification process or the examination process was more rigorous, the grounding may not have happened, even have tainted the personnel in place prior to the collision.

MR. STRAUCH: While listening to your, you know, analysis of what happened on the Greeneville, it's clear that you believe that improvements could be made in selection and training, but one area that I didn't hear you talk about is oversight.

Why is that? Why didn't you say anything about oversight?

LT. COEN: I think I did talk about oversight when I talked about the people outside the submarine command, people at the Squadron and SUBPAC level, who certify and evaluate the ship.

In the routine evaluations and especially in

the recertification process, after the collision, I think there was oversight there. I think it was clearly ineffective or ineffective at least in some areas in navigation aspects.

MR. STRAUCH: Okay. I -- I was very impressed with your description of what went wrong on the Greeneville on February 9th. Could you point to any specific rule that either Commander Waddle or the XO violated?

LT. COEN: The most obvious rule I see is the -- is the two three-minute rule and the ship's standing orders per TMA was not followed, and that -- that's a specific rule.

The other rule would be TMA was not done on CR-14. I don't know why that occurred, but clearly it did not occur. I think things beyond that step away from requirements and set more in a guidance and maybe more of the way you train instead of hard fast rules and requirements.

MR. STRAUCH: Well, I question that rule, specifically that rule, and if the CO violates a standing order that he himself established, is that a rule violation? Does that mean he has the authority to not follow a standing order that he established if he

thinks it appropriate?

LT. COEN: I'm not an expert on when a CO can violate his own rules, and if I really talk about him violating his own rules since he established the rule, it's my opinion he can determine when he wants to apply that.

I would think that if the CO determines that it's necessary to violate a rule, he should explain that so it's clear to everyone that this is not a standard practice and that here are the necessary circumstances why I'm going to violate this rule.

MR. STRAUCH: Okay.

LT. COEN: Now, in some situations, there may not be time to explain that if it's the type of situation, a war time situation, where maybe COs have more experience, more training, can do things that are -- that are less safe but for tactical reasons, and it's in that situation, not a peace time situation.

I know that we were not in that situation in February, and no explanation was given why we were deviating from the standard procedure.

MR. STRAUCH: The -- it's also clear that you've thought a lot about your role in all this and what you'd do differently next time. So, if a brand-new

officer was to come to you for advice, what would you tell him about his need to be concerned with safety versus the obligation to maintain standard chain of command, and the need to watch out for his own career? Isn't there an inherent conflict there among these three items?

LT. COEN: What were the three items again?

MR. STRAUCH: The need to adhere to safety, the need to follow the chain of command, and the need to do what's best for his own career.

LT. COEN: I don't think there should be. I think there should all be consistent goals, and I think that you would follow safety, you should be following the guidance of the chain of command and that should be career-enhancing.

When they go against each other, I think you've got problems. I don't know how to state that, especially to a new junior officer who, for most of his time on board, is spent learning and qualifying, and he's doing that from people who are senior to him, and he has to trust and have faith in them that they know what they're talking about.

I mean, he can back that up with some book knowledge and, you know, reading the requirements, but

for a large part, the training he gets on board a submarine is by observing others and performing under instruction watches. If this presents a problem on board a submarine, and maybe for any organization that really trains itself, if you get into a problem of almost in-breeding of training, if you get someone who doesn't learn something because the person who taught it to him wasn't important, and he just thinks it's not important, he's not going to pass it on to the next person, and you're going to lose that knowledge there until he gets someone with new blood, maybe a new department head, executive officer, a commanding officer, who feel that this is necessary and trains back to that level of knowledge or that standard there that may not have been passed on before.

There's a profession there where everybody learns from people above them, and if they don't learn everything and what is passed on depends in large part from person-to-person, the checklist, to make sure that everything goes through and signs off that they know what they're supposed to know, but the emphasis is given to different items, in large part, will depend on the emphasis that was placed on that person, where he learned that information.

If you look at Greeneville, for instance, between myself and the next officer above me, there was a year and a half gap. So, if you look at the pass-down of knowledge, there's a significant amount of time there where knowledge may not have been passed down as fluidly.

You also look at my career. I was trained under Commander Waddle as were a large part of the junior officers below me. So, what does that say about our training, if we're Waddle-trained? I think after the collision, you removed Commander Waddle, but clearly there was still problems present afterwards.

How much of that was due to the training that was already in place or had already occurred? So, you should constantly train, but it's a hard problem to -- to know what the ship's weak areas are, unless you get effective evaluation by outside sources, and whether that's a new department head or executive officer or commanding officer coming in and saying here are some weak areas that I've noticed or if it's review teams coming on board to examine the ship and saying here's some weak areas.

It's also up to the ship to go back and examine those areas and fix them. If they don't do

that, then clearly they haven't used that review process to their advantage.

MR. STRAUCH: Just a couple more small questions. The chief of staff was on the ship. What was your sense of how he was treated compared to the other -- the other officers?

LT. COEN: You mean on that day or --

MR. STRAUCH: No. In general, not on that day.

LT. COEN: The chief of staff's son-in-law was the ship's engineer. He was a department head. Engineering is a very difficult department to run. The Navy knows that by automatically giving the ship's engineer a promotion, basically to lieutenant commander, upon taking the billet and probably means more money because it is a more difficult job and assigns him the junior officer who reports on board to carry out the different responsibilities of that department, whereas other department heads may have one or two junior officers working for them. The majority of them work for the engineer.

My sense of the chief of staff was that he was a very competent naval officer, I think the best ship driver we had on board, and I think one of the

hardest-working officers on board, just from my experience with him, since I worked for him in the department.

Is there something you're asking related to him being the son-in-law of the chief of staff?

MR. STRAUCH: What I was getting at was did you sense any double standards because he was the son-in-law of the chief of staff?

LT. COEN: No, not at all. I mean, some people in the ward room knew that he was the son-in-law of the chief of staff, but the chief of staff had never been on board the ship before, and I don't really remember when the chief of staff was out here in Pearl Harbor. I'm not sure if he was out here the whole time or when he became the chief of staff, but in my experience, that was not in any way to give him favor or disfavor, you know. People who worked for him were the people that he works for, the XO and the CO.

MR. STRAUCH: At the Court of Inquiry, the -- I believe it was the navigator who described that he had talked to Commander Waddle about his -- his leadership style, that it was such that he often did not give junior officers the opportunity to make their own mistakes.

Did you know that before the Court of Inquiry, that the navigator had talked to Commander Waddle about that?

LT. COEN: Yes, I did. The biggest example I have of that is the day before pulling into port, on February 2nd, from our Eastern Pacific Deployment, the ship was doing an operation with another ship, and when I was the officer of the deck and had direct confrontation with the CO in the way the ship was being driven, and the navigator indicated to me that the situation, explained my position as an officer of the deck wanting to drive the ship and experience -- you know, making my own mistakes, you know, under the advice of the senior officer, rather than directly follow the order of the senior officer and not learn as much or, you know, make any mistakes in his frame of view.

So, I know that the ship's navigator talked to the commanding officer because later that -- that watch, the ship's navigator came back and sort of mentored me through that evolution, and I know that had been a source of previous discussion with the commanding officer.

I am good friends with the ship's navigator.

We live in the same state room, and we live on the same street. Our wives are familiar. They spend a lot of time together. So, this -- he had had the discussion with the commanding officer. It was not a surprise to me. I had known about that, and as the senior watch officer, he wanted to ensure that junior officers and even department heads, officers of the deck, had more chances to drive the ship and make their own mistakes and learn from that.

We're not talking made mistakes that are severe like a depth mistake, just simple how to drive a ship and better ways of using it.

MR. STRAUCH: When you learned that he had talked to the CO about it, did your training with the CO change after that?

LT. COEN: I don't know. I did have respect for the commanding officer. He would tell me a lot about how to be a naval officer, how to be officer of the watch, how to be an officer of the deck. There was still a lot more that I felt I could learn from him, and I thought the way he taught me was less effective in other ways.

What I would have desired was more of a teaching approach where he explained to me his ideas

and processes and how they affect the problem and how I should react to that rather than simple direct orders with no explanation.

The fact that he was confronted on this and the position made that junior officers and department heads wanted more time to drive, I guess, without such direct input, I'm not really sure that changed my opinion of him. I still had as much respect for him, but I knew his personality, and that he took a lot of pride in driving the ship as well.

I think if anything, it made me more frustrated when those occasions did occur, knowing that he had been talked to or talked with about the situation.

MR. STRAUCH: What about when you -- when you talked about the CO with other officers when the CO wasn't around? For example, the two incidents that you described, the incident and the other incident with the emergency blow. What was your sense of their feelings towards the CO, the other -- the other officers?

LT. COEN: I think there was respect balanced with his personality and that he was very proud of the submarine and was very out-going and very happy to play his role as commanding officer and owner of the

submarine.

I think after -- I don't think we ever thought that he was intentionally putting the ship in danger, but I think it became apparent that there was cause for concern that the public relations may have not been in the safest interests of the ship, but I don't think we ever felt that the CO was -- was unsafe.

I think -- not that he was consciously being unsafe, that he was consciously more involved with the public relations and everything else was an afterthought.

MR. STRAUCH: You say "it became apparent". Was this before the collision?

LT. COEN: I think San Francisco was a great example of public relations playing the first part. Anything else was minor in how he drove the ship, and following the guidance or following the guidance of the navigation pilot or following the plan that was briefed at the harbor brief were second thoughts.

MR. STRAUCH: You said yesterday that Commander Waddle was very proud of Greeneville and that was why the Greeneville seemed to be getting more of the civilian cruises than other ships in the Squadron.

Would this perhaps also be another example of

his attention more to public relations than -- than other things?

LT. COEN: Can you ask the question again or rephrase it?

MR. STRAUCH: Well, what I'm trying to do is I'm trying to get at what you -- what you just said now, that apparently there was a sense that he was -- was very attentive to the public relations aspects of his job.

You said yesterday that the Greeneville seemed to be getting more of -- more DV cruises, more civilian cruises, than other ships. Do you think the two are related?

LT. COEN: Yes. I think the commanding officer's personality drove the ship to become more involved with DV cruises and events of that nature. I think he asked for more of those from the Squadron and SUBPAC, you know. Whenever he wanted to take out -- everything was kind of built around, you know, we were the tour boat, you know, out here in Pearl Harbor.

We did many DV tours. Even our East PAC was to a large part midshipman operations which are giving tours and port visits in Santa Barbara, so the City of Santa Barbara could have a submarine in their harbor on

the 4th of July, and we could show off the submarine in the City of Santa Barbara.

MR. STRAUCH: How did the other officers feel about that?

LT. COEN: I think the other officers were proud to show off the ship as well. They were proud of what they had. I think there was a longing for more of a tactical mission in the two years that I was there than the -- the more public tour ship and the midshipmen operations.

MR. STRAUCH: Did he act any differently under these kinds of civilian cruises than he did on a truly tactical, truly training mission when civilians were not on board?

LT. COEN: Yes. He spent more of his time with the guests and involving them in aspects of ship operations. I mean, he was -- when the guests were on board, that was what he spent time doing.

MR. STRAUCH: Why would a CO want to spend -- want to be devoted to public affairs, as Commander Waddle apparently was? What's in it for him?

LT. COEN: I think it enhances his career if the submarine has a good reputation and gets a lot of feedback from the public, that we enjoyed your tour on

the submarine, thanks so much for your tour, and if the ship has a good reputation, it enhances his career.

I think he wanted to -- he was very proud of his submarine, and I'm not saying it was career development is why he showed off the submarine. The reason he showed off the submarine was because he was proud of it and it was his personality.

Even if it didn't help his career, I think he would have shown off the submarine to the same aspect just because that's who he was.

MR. STRAUCH: Well, you know, the Court of Inquiry looked into the issue of DV cruises pretty carefully, and I didn't hear anybody in reading the transcripts say this is a bad thing. Everybody said it was a good thing.

So, here you have a CO who apparently is using the DV cruises as a way to enhance his own career. He spends more time with the civilians when they're on board than he may with any -- than he should be on attending to ship --

CAPTAIN KYLE: You're drawing a conclusion about enhancing his career.

MR. STRAUCH: Yes, that's true. Perhaps -- perhaps in the interest of safety, they shouldn't have

these DV cruises. What is your opinion on that?

LT. COEN: I don't think that having visitors on board is what caused this accident. I don't think having distinguished visitors on board to operate equipment under the instruction of qualified operators caused this.

I think it's appropriate. I think it's more apparent to me as a junior officer than it is to people in higher positions in the Navy of that purpose. I think it should be done and handled very carefully, and I -- I don't think Commander Waddle showed off the submarine to enhance his career. I think he showed it off because he was proud of it.

I think he was equally as proud to do his tactical mission, going on West PAC Deployment. What he did on board is what he was assigned to do, and he didn't go out and do a DV cruise or a midshipman cruise because he's the commanding officer and wanted to do that. He did that because the people who say where the submarine goes told him that's what he was going to do.

He may have asked for that input, but it wasn't his submarine to take out and do what he wanted with. He was told to take out a DV cruise or do midshipman operations or whatever.

MR. STRAUCH: I've just got a couple of other questions on another issue, so we'll shift gears.

Do you remember about what time you got up in the morning on February 9th?

LT. COEN: No, I don't. I mean, it was one day underway. So, we left pretty early. Probably 7 or 8, we left. I don't think I was involved with the actual start-up, but to come on board -- oh, and it was probably pretty early. Probably around 6 or 7, to get the ship ready for the guests. So, probably a couple hours prior to that, but I can't remember the exact time.

MR. STRAUCH: Well, what I'm trying to do is just to get the time you went to sleep and the time you woke for each day in the three days prior to the accident. Could you remember that far back?

LT. COEN: Not really. I can tell you that we were in port, and we had just got back in port from a month of being at sea. We were involved with classroom trainers. I'm not sure if I had duty that week. If I had duty that week, I would have got less sleep that night as other nights.

CAPTAIN KYLE: I think we filled out a table for that in February for them. Do you remember filling

that out?

LT. COEN: No, I don't remember.

CAPTAIN KYLE: We collected that data for everybody involved.

MR. STRAUCH: I remember that, and the last question is, are you familiar with the term "bridge resource management"?

LT. COEN: No.

MR. STRAUCH: Is there another question we need to ask on that?

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Yeah. I would suggest that you might ask him if he perhaps doesn't know the exact term, if he's familiar with the type of training that that might encompass.

MR. STRAUCH: Yeah. It's related to training that originated in commercial aviation, the idea being that each crew member on an air transport aircraft contributes to the safe operation of the -- of the aircraft.

The junior -- junior flight crew members, first officers are trained to be assertive rather than deferential, the senior officers or the captain are trained to be the final authority, yet to seek the input of the first officers and his or her decisions.

So, it's designed to optimize the strengths of each crew member, so that together, the unified crew is -- is a more effective crew than they would be as individuals.

I guess the question is, have you encountered training like that, analogous training, in your career?

LT. COEN: I'm not really sure I understand what you're talking about. What I can tell you, though, is that a submarine's a team of people that work together, and that they're designed to function as a team. They know what the other part's doing, and I'm speaking now more as an officer, a ship driver.

I know what each part of the ship's control party does, what the sonar team does, what the fire control party does, and they know what information I expect from them. The submarine would not operate if there wasn't communication between the different parts of it. It just -- it's a team, and the team knows that it relies on each other and good information flow is essential to that.

I mean, the ship's control party can drive the ship, but if they don't know where to go, if the quartermaster is not telling them or the sonar party is not telling them where the contacts are, it's not going

to function.

MR. STRAUCH: I have no further questions.

MR. CRIDER: As I said earlier, I have dreamed up a couple. Couple questions. What -- when -- in your experience, your experience on board the ship with Commander Waddle or with, you know, while you were on the ship thus far, what was -- what happened to people when they made mistakes? Say you may have screwed something up, you know, were you -- were you -- you know, what -- how was that handled?

LT. COEN: I'm trying to think of a good example.

MR. CRIDER: Well, go to periscope depth and decide to go left to clear baffle, the captain thinks right's better. Would he tell you to go right instead? That's kind of what I perceived. Say you proceed to make a mistake by going left instead of right when he would tell you to go right, is that --

LT. COEN: Yes, sir. In that example, and I think for the most part, Commander Waddle, if he would explain to you the situation, if you did something wrong, and he was not extreme. He would not yell at you. He would not fly off the handle if you did something wrong. That's in some aspects.

In other aspects, if there wasn't really communication, when he was driving or when he was giving orders to drive the ship off of angles and dangles, I one time went to go to grab the paper to make an officer's report, and he firmly directed me to get back over behind the dive and drive the ship because that's where I needed to focus my attention.

MR. CRIDER: Do you think that was an appropriate correction or not?

LT. COEN: Yes, I do. I think during maneuvers, that's where I needed to be.

MR. CRIDER: So, how'd that make you feel when he talked to you about that? Were you embarrassed? Were you chagrined? Were you -- did you feel threatened by that? Did you feel --

LT. COEN: Well, at -- at -- I felt at the time that I could have made the -- I know because the ship was approaching the closer depth and was approaching a fatal condition, and I had not yet issued another order, and the ship was no longer in its transient process where it was maneuvering.

I think that's why I felt that I had time to go make an officer's report. I think Commander Waddle had another command for me in his head already to issue

and wanted me to continue in the same place, continue with the evolutions that he wanted to direct.

Commander Waddle turn it on and off as far as being the mentor and training somebody and kind of going through and showing -- picking out the mistakes and showing what area required improvement, and I think a lot of that fell on his -- his nuclear training as an auditor, but also at times, he could be less rigorous in those standards.

I don't think there was a command climate on board where people feared him and feared being wrong in front of him. No one likes to be wrong in front of their superior officers, let alone a commanding officer, but I don't -- to answer your question, I don't think there was a command climate present that feared negative action upon if they were wrong.

MR. CRIDER: You didn't feel like your career was in jeopardy if you made a mistake?

LT. COEN: No.

MR. CRIDER: No. Okay. So, -- so, a few minutes ago, you talked about you kind of lost faith in the selection process of some of your superiors and the chain of command above you, and, you know, this is a lingering doubt now, and as you go forward, you'll have

this concern, and I'm kind of interested in that a little bit.

Your perception of faith in your commanding officers, you know, what -- what did you expect out of the commanding officer or your XO or your department head or the guys assigned, you know, to the ship with more experience than you in terms of what your expectations of those guys?

LT. COEN: I -- I'd expect an executive officer who saw insufficient data on his sonar screen to make that known prior to the ship going to periscope depth.

MR. CRIDER: Okay, okay. Let's stop right there. I got it. I understand what you're going to say. I think I know what you're going to say. So, -- so, in regard to Mr. Strauch's question a minute ago, of bridge management, a term I'm not familiar with either, I understand the concept of what he's talking about, the XO had an obligation to speak up in your mind. You'd expect him to speak up.

So, what does that mean? I mean, are you expecting, say, that the commanding officer be infallible or that the climate exists that he could receive criticism without -- that he would appreciate

criticism or -- or back-up in view of -- you know, expect back-up from his juniors in command, when appropriate?

I mean, it sounds like you expect that from the XO to the CO. But what about yourself --

LT. COEN: Okay.

MR. CRIDER: -- in response to what the captain did?

LT. COEN: Could you ask the question again?

MR. CRIDER: What do you expect -- you talk about faith in the command. Are you expecting -- what are you expecting there? I just want to make sure I understand.

LT. COEN: Okay.

MR. CRIDER: You talked about the experience -- let me rephrase it. I don't think I was very clear in what I'm trying to convey here.

The captain has to support the ship. You could have a new captain when you get out there that you've never met before probably, and -- and you said, "I have certain expectations and faith. I'm supposed to have faith in this guy as my captain." What -- what do you mean by that?

LT. COEN: I expect the captain to play the

role of supervisor and to -- I don't expect any human being to be infallible. I expect -- I expect a team on a submarine to effectively back each other up, so when someone, whoever that may be, makes a mistake or error in judgment, that it is caught and that the problem is minimized and that the damage is minimized.

I expect superiors to listen to juniors and listen to their words of caution and -- and not dismiss them without, I guess, an explanation of why they're not going to follow their advice, but always appreciate that question. You know, thank you for keeping me honest. You know, I'm going to need that one day.

MR. CRIDER: So, you're saying for some reason or another, I guess putting it into a summary just to make sure I understand what you're saying, for some reason or another, you don't think that that kind of situation, that kind of climate, I guess, to use that term, existed on Greeneville on the 9th of February?

LT. COEN: No, I don't. I don't think it existed there. I think you had numerous cases, different individuals with different levels of experience, all now -- I'm guessing how everybody felt, but that something was different than usual, different

than how they were trained and normally operated and did not do anything to effect a change in that and that goes down to the most junior petty officer at the fire control screen or in sonar to the senior officer present to the chief of staff.

MR. CRIDER: Okay. So, -- so, was that -- do you think in your experience then, was that different on the 9th of February than a common day on the Greeneville?

LT. COEN: Yes, I do.

MR. CRIDER: And is there any sole thing or was it a combination of many factors that caused that to be different on the 9th than --

LT. COEN: I think it was a combination of factors. I think the biggest factor was that there were DVs on board that day. But I think if you look at other examples, like San Francisco, you got the navigator recommending following the charted position as briefed. You've got a pilot recommending something, an executive officer who's witness to this as watches -- people below decks, with the exception of the bridge, and there's not DVs present.

There was a captain, lieutenant commander, riding from SUBPAC and Squadron on board, but still the

commanding officer overrode those decisions or those -- that advice and, you know, several hundred gallons of water was taken on board and severe damage was done to the ship. Luckily, no personal damage was done, and people were not injured.

MR. CRIDER: But the captain did receive feedback from the navigator or the XO or did they just comply with what the captain wanted or you don't -- do you know?

LT. COEN: There was some feedback given. The inspection was clear. I'm not sure.

MR. CRIDER: But it's a big difference on February 9th. People didn't give feedback. In the San Francisco case, that's what I'm trying to get at, was feedback given and the captain just decided not to -- I mean, there's no obligation anywhere in the rules that says the captain has to do everything --

LT. COEN: Right.

MR. CRIDER: -- that he receives in feedback.

LT. COEN: Yes, sir.

MR. CRIDER: But at least accept and acknowledge the feedback and say got it, understand, we're going to do this instead, at least possibly consider the input and make his decision. Did that

happen, as far as you know, on -- in the San Francisco case? Was there feedback provided? Did the nav object?

LT. COEN: To my knowledge, feedback was given. I'm not sure how aggressively it was pursued, and I think that is another one of my concerns. You've got to evaluate your concerns and the danger involved with the ship and basically decide how important it is that you be heard, and if you politely say this is wrong and walk away, I don't think you've tried to really communicate what you're doing here.

MR. CRIDER: The guy's not doing his job.

LT. COEN: So, I think you need to be aggressive until you're heard. The biggest thing, I think, that San Francisco shows me is that people need to be more aggressive to maybe make their point known to Commander Waddle.

MR. CRIDER: Okay. That's all I have. Thanks.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. Lieutenant, I've just a couple questions, and I think we'll probably be done with you.

You mentioned yesterday that after the collision had occurred, you had a conversation with FT1 Seacrest concerning the contacts that he held and which

contact he'd collided with and how this could have happened.

Could you elaborate a little bit more on -- on what was said between you and -- if you can recall?

LT. COEN: In my discussions with Petty Officer Seacrest following the collision, I had a printout from the fire control screen of the time-bearing mode. I think it was approximately an hour old, and the time history was compressed to display not much data.

I was looking at that piece of information trying to construct what happened and what contact we hit, and basically my discussion with Petty Officer Seacrest involved the time-bearing fire control printout, and we discussed CR-13 and CR-14 and which of those two contacts we believed we hit. That's pretty much the scope of our discussion.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: And at that time, did you -- were you able to determine which contact it was that you had hit?

LT. COEN: At the time, I believe we hit CR-14 and that was based on the single leg of data, and I think the bearing of CR-14 was closer to the ship's head at the time of collision, the ship's course. So, I

think that's the contact that at the time I thought we hit. The reconstruction later shows that it was CR-13.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Was Petty Officer Seacrest helpful in your analysis of the time-bearing printout? Did -- did he assist you in making that determination of which contact you had hit or was that your own determination?

LT. COEN: I don't recall if he assisted me or not. Basically, we were both looking at the same piece of paper and, you know, scratching our heads and trying to figure out what happened. I -- I don't think he helped me draw any conclusions from what happened.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: So, even after the collision, Petty Officer Seacrest really didn't know which contact had -- the ship had collided with?

LT. COEN: He didn't help me understand that. If he had better knowledge of who we'd actually hit, it wasn't made apparent to me.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: During your previous watches as officer of the deck, you stood watch with probably a number of different FPOWs. Is that a fair assumption?

LT. COEN: Yes. During my time as officer of the deck, I've stood watch with probably everyone in -- in the division who stood FPOW.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: And during those various times, standing watches with fire control men, were you able to make an evaluation of the capabilities, relative capabilities of -- of each of these individuals, and, second, were you able to -- how did you place Petty Officer Seacrest in -- in -- in that range of, you know, performers? Was he average or -- or did you not have any -- any judgments about, you know, where he fell into the --

LT. COEN: I believe Petty Officer Seacrest's performance as an FPOW was average, average for the position. He was senior. He was a first class petty officer, but I don't think he was the best watchstander.

I think he had more technical knowledge than maybe most of the division, most of the people in the division, but as far as a watchstander, I think there were other people who were better watchstanders.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. Okay. Could you briefly tell us what sort of training you've had in the past month that you've been off the vessel just briefly, just out of curiosity? What -- is it standard training in preparation for another job or what was that all about?

LT. COEN: Right now, I'm in Nuclear Engineering Officer School and basically the school is for approximately two months, where I study many different aspects to become an engineer on board a submarine.

Part of the standard process, training process for junior officers and as a prerequisite to coming back to sea as a department head.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. In the past, when you've done periscope searches, had you ever had the opportunity to broach the ship or to go beyond 5-8 feet or what was the procedure on that, standard procedure on -- on getting a high look?

LT. COEN: Yes, I've had the ship shallower than 5-8 before. Typically, the ship would not broach based on just trying to remain a submarine and remain as unequitable as possible.

The standard procedure for broaching, I don't know if there really is one. It's not something that's really trained to do and time to broach, you know, prior to surfacing the ship or if you wanted to do an extremely high look and were not concerned about counter-detection.

Typically, a high look would be something

less than broached but, you know, shallower than 5-8 feet.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: And what would that difference be?

LT. COEN: Approximately 5-5 feet.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: So, you had in the past gone up to 5-5 feet to get a high look?

LT. COEN: Yes.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. I think I have about one more question.

You've had a chance to either read or review the -- the transcript of the Court of Inquiry, is that correct?

LT. COEN: Yes, I have.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: And were you present at the Court of Inquiry generally for most of it or all of it or --

LT. COEN: Yes, I was present for all of it.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. Was there anything said during -- during that -- those proceedings that -- that particularly stuck with you as -- as really didn't agree with -- with the way you felt about the response that was given or you maybe disagreed with something?

Anything come to your mind that you might

have disagreed with in terms of a recollection of an officer or a factual statement or anything like that? Anything come to your mind about that?

LT. COEN: I don't disagree with any of the findings of the Court of Inquiry. I think the Court of Inquiry could have done a better job at investigating all aspects of the collision, especially events prior to the collision, which may have led to insight into Commander Waddle's behavior.

I think their investigation technique was a little backwards. The Court of Inquiry is not a court-martial. Much of the testimony given at the Court of Inquiry were from expert people but not true witnesses of the collision, and I think too much emphasis was put on what expert witnesses thought as opposed to gathering factual evidence from people on board the submarine and then having the Court construct their conclusions from that.

I think the Court constructed a lot of conclusions from people not present and then gathered a picture of what happened and then from there proceeded on to interview witnesses who were present on board the submarine.

For instance, the Court spent a lot of time

with Admiral Burkis who did the preliminary investigation in trying to understand what he thought happened. Also spent time with Captain Kyle and his extensive work in the reconstruction and what Captain Kyle reconstructed as to what happened.

They also talked to the Admiral with SUBPAC and the Commodore from Squadron One, spent a lot of time with those people, before they went into the witnesses who were actually present there, and I think there was still information to be gathered from witnesses who were present, but I think some of the information was gathered from the people who were interviewed who were not present on board.

They spent much more time with non-witnesses than people who were there. I think they spent more time figuring out what they think happened based on those initial reports than piecing together the actual people's testimonies who were present and fitting that into a cleaner picture than opposed to a picture that had already been painted by people who weren't present at the time.

I don't think they investigated all aspects concerning the collision, previous command trouble with Commander Waddle and aspects of that, and previous DV

cruises and how that related to the handling of classified material, specifically the ship speed and depth.

The handling of classified material, I thought was peculiar, based on some of the stuff that was discussed in the Court of Inquiry was classified material or previously-classified material. Also, the desire to maintain an open court for the most part, I think, tended to stay away from certain aspects of the investigation that were of a confidential nature from propulsion-related material. That was one of the ways which I think contributed to the added rush. I don't think that was sufficiently investigated.

The Court of Inquiry kind of -- I'm not sure exactly what pressure -- what pressure essentially the Court of Inquiry had, and it seemed that it reacted very rapidly and didn't investigate some issues.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. I guess what I'd like now is to ask you if you have any other comments before we -- well, let me first ask the interviewers here at the table if there's any further questions?

(No response)

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. Then I'd just again ask you rather than responding to a direct question

from one of us, if you have anything that you would like to add beyond what you've already said? It's been very helpful to us.

LT. COEN: I would like to say that I hope the NTSB's investigation and Captain Kyle being present at that can help the Navy find some of the problems that are present on the Greeneville and may be present elsewhere and cause the necessary changes to fix those problems.

I think it may be more -- the correction may be more involved than simply removing the commanding officer or the chain of command in the case of the grounding and more than a simple recertification process.

I think the Navy should look at the recertification process and make that a more effective review and more in-depth, and I hope that the recertification process following the Greeneville's recent grounding will be more rigorous than the certification process after the grounding -- correction -- the collision.

I hope the Navy will look at the problem of personnel and the training issue there, and I think it's more than just a Greeneville problem, it may be a

system problem in that two commanding officers with similar backgrounds but different submarines and different experiences ran aground and were found sufficiently at fault to be removed for cause.

I don't think that's specifically a problem solely with the training of commanding officers but can be traced back to training problems with executive officers and department heads and with senior officers. Look at that training program.

I think the Navy could look at issues involving commanding officer screening processes. A new commanding officer, Commander Bogdin, came in to a ship with problems. He's from the same pipeline and was not effective in sufficiently causing changes that would have safety of navigation of the ship.

I think the Navy could look at the difference in training standards between nuclear-trained personnel and the forward part of the ship and increase the standard of the forward part of the ship and do more rigorous evaluations of the forward part of the ship, including navigation and systems personnel.

I think the Navy needs to do a better job of training forcible back-up. It's a very difficult thing for a junior officer to confront a superior officer,

but there are instances where it really has to happen, and I think if the Navy trained some more on that, it may be more effective in preventing further accidents from happening.

I think there needs to be extensive training or continued training on what the CON needs and lieutenant commander officers to be careful not to take the CON unknowingly and trained officers of the deck to be careful not to yield it unknowingly and to make it very clear that distinction.

Also training commanding officers to keep their role as supervisor a high priority. By removing that role from supervisors, it places the ship in a very peculiar situation where there may not be someone to -- with oversight to see a problem, and it especially makes the issue of forcible back-up very important.

After the collision, I was concerned because I thought a lot of the ship thought it was -- the problems of the ship were because of one man and that since Commander Waddle was removed, the problem was restored. I think there's bigger problems on the ship than Commander Waddle, and I think the same applies now after the grounding.

I want to caution the people on the boat that it may be more than just a navigation problem. There may be other aspects of ship training that need improvement.

I'd also like the Navy to look -- take a look at the senior leadership in the Navy, at the Squadron and SUBPAC level, and force the leadership to get more involved when they smell problems or when they hear about problems and to make sure that those don't become more severe.

I think there were examples, when you review the history, that we're asking for more involvement outside of the submarine, ultimately, you know, to help the ship in their training process and maybe effect a different change here.

So, I hope your investigation can find these problems and assist the Navy in fixing them.

Thank you.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. Lt. Coen, we'd like to thank you very much for your very reasoned responses to our questions and your taking the time to come down and talk to us, and anybody else have any other comments? Barry or Dennis?

Okay. So, the time is about 1418, and that

will conclude our interview of Lt. Coen.

(Whereupon, at 2:18 p.m., the interview was concluded.)

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